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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to provide an academic, external perspective to facilitate
the implementation and development of a new internal organization for Raytheon Missile
Systems (RMS) with a focus on strategy and the organization. The new organization,
named the Advanced Manufacturing Development Center (AMDC), is chartered to work
concurrently with the design community to develop state-of-the-art manufacturing
technology to compliment the next generation engineering designs. .
This thesis documents the efforts of a company implementing change detailing the
specific challenges they faced. The principle lessons learned during the course of this
project are (1) that effectively introducing change is very difficult and depends largely on
thorough planning and understanding the culture and (2) that manufacturing innovation
and development is a critical step to improving the manufacturing capabilities and
providing a competitive advantage to a company.
The defense industry is undergoing a lean transformation that focuses on "Better, Faster,
Cheaper" defense systems demanding better products within a faster development
timeframe at cheaper development and production costs. Defense companies have an
external push to improve their manufacturing capabilities. In the context of the defense
industry, adapting to change is a slow process given the industry's clockspeed and
historical development. Making the challenge of effective implementation even more
difficult is the lack of urgency at RMS's due to their success in the marketplace.
Benchmarking and organizational studies specific to the industry and the company were
conducted to identify best practices to provide a basis for the development of the AMDC.
This project uses academic research to identify existing theories on manufacturing
innovation and organizational change to overcome the socialization and cultural issues
that ensued from implementing change and to improve the potential sustainability and
impact of the AMDC. An implementation roadmap and operational model were
generated that combined the best practices found in industry and academic theories that
would help meet the objectives of the AMDC.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
This thesis is the culmination of a six-month internship project within the Operations
Organization of Raytheon Missile Systems (RMS) and the subsequent work of the author
at MIT as a part of the Leaders for Manufacturing Program. The project scope was to
facilitate the implementation and development of a new organization, the Advanced
Manufacturing Development Center, within Operations. The new organization's charter
is to develop new manufacturing capabilities that would match the needs of advanced
product technologies currently in development, thereby creating a competitive advantage
for RMS. The premise behind this research is that transferring knowledge from academia
and existing research would provide a framework to effectively introduce change within
an organization. The key research topics in this investigation are to understand the
importance of (1) identifying and compensating for the socialization issues that arise
when introducing change into an organization, (2) manufacturing innovation in building a
competitive advantage, and (3) creating a learning organization for increased
effectiveness in the development and sustainability of new manufacturing capabilities.
This thesis will seek to characterize the defense industry and detail the forces driving
companies to change and the specific challenges faced in attempting to implement
change. Also, this research will attempt to characterize the culture of Raytheon Missile
Systems to identify leverage areas to successfully implement the new organization.
Published literature describes a model for the dynamics of innovation in both product and
process development as it relates to a product's life cycle. Using this model, this thesis
will assess a company's product and characterize it within its lifecycle to determine the
need and opportunity for continued manufacturing and process innovation. In addition,
this research will seek to identify operational parameters for effective manufacturing
innovation.
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1.1. Defining the Business Problem
Currently, design engineers within advanced research and development labs at Raytheon
Missile Systems (RMS) are isolated from manufacturing. Often, the design engineers
have developed a state-of-the-art product but the existing manufacturing technology is
inadequate for production. The disconnect between engineering and manufacturing can
result in a myriad of problems such as longer development time, more difficult transition
from development to production, longer ramp-up time, lower manufacturing yields,
higher rework ratios, and longer extensive test cycles to validate the performance of each
product. All of these problems lead to higher unit costs and a damaged reputation for
developing and delivering new systems to existing and potential customers.
More importantly, the defense industry is currently undergoing a lean transformation.
Customer expectations of cost and time for new system development will soon exceed
current capabilities. Also, military and defense needs are shifting and are redefining the
requirements and skills needed for companies to deliver new products. To be responsive
to these changing customer needs, a company should be flexible and adapt to the new
nature of the industry. A company's ability to develop and deliver new systems to meet
new customer needs within their requirements will determine their competitive standing.
However, the effective development of new products is hampered by engineering's
existing practice to "throw the design over the wall" to manufacturing. In general, this
concept describes the end of requirements and responsibilities from one entity to the
other with little to no accountability linking the overall process.
Ideally, companies that are facing this environment such as RMS should modify their
entire product development cycle by eliminating the ivory walls that have traditionally
separated product development from the rest of the enterprise. By having the engineering
and manufacturing communities working together to fulfill the same purpose, they can
more efficiently deliver high quality advanced products and systems to the customer.
This vision, however, requires a massive realignment of the existing organizations and
culture. In addition, this requires the elimination of the silo mentality that prevents
- 12-
collaboration across boundary lines as well as the introduction of accountability from
initial concept development to system delivery.
Unfortunately, breaking down the existing barriers between engineering and
manufacturing has troubled both academics and enterprises. Combining the two
communities is a challenging endeavor given the diametrically opposed cultures and
sometimes adversarial relationships that exist between them. "Since most dominant
orientations incorporate implicit, if not explicit, judgments as to the relative importance
of various functions and their roles in achieving a competitive advantage, they establish
strong mind-sets within an organization as to the role that manufacturing should play in
its competitive strategy." A complete redefinition of a company's existing business
practices is an extremely risky undertaking. The time required for the enterprise to reach
a steady state could be prohibitively long. There are also no guarantees that the change
will be successful and that effective coordination will result. Drastically shocking the
existing system could result in an enterprise whose performance is significantly inferior
to before the shock was introduced.
A more manageable undertaking could involve the implementation of accountability and
ensuring that product development efforts span the entire process. Adding accountability
throughout the process would require programs to identify and address the manufacturing
technology needs and mitigate the manufacturing risks early in development. Being able
to develop new manufacturing technologies and processes would result in an expansion
of the internal manufacturing capabilities with the potential to affect the rest of the supply
chain at a later date. Building new manufacturing capabilities would create a competitive
advantage for RMS. Subsequent sections of this thesis will outline the additional benefits
of manufacturing innovation.
However, in the context of the defense industry, adapting to change of any magnitude is
difficult. Making the challenge even more difficult within RMS is the lack of urgency or
'Robert H. Hayes and Steven C. Wheelwright, Restoring Our Competitive Edge: Competing Through
Manufacturing. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), pg 38.
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a "burning platform" to encourage effective implementation of any change let alone such
a drastic one as described above.
In order to innovate manufacturing processes and technologies, RMS leadership has
decided to create an Advanced Manufacturing Development Center (AMDC) with the
goal of minimizing the organizational shock. In the past, RMS had a research
organization devoted to developing manufacturing technologies. However, this
organization was disconnected from the product development research and the
manufacturing technologies that ensued were not applicable within the business. To
prevent the same scenario, the AMDC is chartered to create practical, low-cost solutions
for the next generation engineering designs. The role of the AMDC is to work
concurrently with the design groups and develop state-of-the-art manufacturing
technology to compliment their designs.
1.2. Manufacturing Innovation
Manufacturing innovation is the research, development and application of new
manufacturing tools, processes and techniques. A fair amount of research has been
undertaken by academics to understand how changes in the competitive environment are
affecting American manufacturing companies. With this research comes a historical
perspective that attempts to explain the factors that drove companies to their current state.
The research results largely dictate the change needed of these companies to remain
competitive.
1.2.1. U.S. Manufacturing - a Historical Context
The state of American manufacturing companies has undergone a significant amount of
scrutiny particularly with the increase of international competition in the 1980's.
"U.S. manufacturing companies [chose] to compete primarily on
dimensions other than manufacturing ability. The United States thought it
had [overcome any production problems]. Therefore, attention and
resources have been directed toward mass distribution, packaging,
advertising, and the development of incremental new products to round
- 14-
out existing product lines or attack specific market segments, instead of
toward improving manufacturing capabilities." 2
The globalization of many different industries creates a direct competition amongst the
different policies. "Managers of competitively successful technology-based German and
Japanese firms have identified a strong pattern of commitment to the development of
advanced process technology. Most of these firms designed and built critical elements of
their own process equipment, and they have gained competitive advantage from unique
products that depend upon proprietary developments in process technology." 3 Henderson
et al. believe "that inadequate attention to process development may be an important
factor in the failure of many U.S. firms to respond effectively to heightened foreign
competition." 4
In describing the competitive environment of the 1980s and beyond, Hayes and
Wheelwright believe
"For many [US] companies the issue had become one of simple survival.
The "secret weapon" of their international competitors was not superior
product designs, marketing ingenuity, or financial strength, but
manufacturing superiority - the ability to 'make it better'...[US
companies under attack] came to realize that they had been systematically
neglecting their manufacturing organizations.. .The skills required to
compete effectively against world class competitors had atrophied." 5
"Too often companies have acted as if they were driven by market and competitive forces
alone, and as if manufacturing's role was simply to respond to those forces by enlisting
and coordinating the adjustments and resources provided by suppliers of parts and
equipment." 6 The competitive environment for most companies is changing the existing
manufacturing system from meeting the new industry needs. Developing new products
without taking into account their manufacturability or the diversity of demands they
2 Hayes & Wheelwright, pg 20
3 Hayes & Wheelwright, pg 19
4 Rebecca M. Henderson, Jesus Del Alamo, Todd Becker, James Lawton, Peter Moran and Saul Shapiro,
"Perils of Excellence: Barriers to Effective Process Improvement in Product-Driven Firms," Production
and Operations Management 7, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pg 3.
'Hayes & Wheelwright, pg viii
6 Hayes & Wheelwright, pg 21
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placed on manufacturing often led to unfocused facilities that tried to be 'jack of all
trades' - and ended up being master's of none." 7
Conversely, the Japanese have a better grasp of not only a vast array of manufacturing
technologies and capabilities but also the skills needed to develop new manufacturing
technologies. "The Japanese pattern [of innovation] would support the popular
stereotype of American firms as innovators and creators of new industries and the
Japanese as skillful at applying their considerable talents of automated production to
product refinement and manufacture." 8  Their mastery and understanding of
manufacturing can be applied to easily imitate products developed by their competitors;
reducing the manufacturing costs and improving the product design effectively
eliminating any advantage from those that initially developed the product.
1.2.2. Innovation through the Development Cycle
"An innovation's changing competitive impact is driven by ongoing innovation
development, emerging complimentary technologies, and the innovation's widening
use."9  William Abernathy and James Utterback contributed a significant amount of
research to the field of innovation. Together, they have developed a model describing the
rate of product and process innovation through the different phases of development,
shown in Figure 1.
'Kim B. Clark and Takahiro Fujimoto, Product Development Performance: Strategy, Organization, and
Management in the WorldAuto Industry. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), pg 54.
8 James M. Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press,
1996), pg 48
9 Dean M. Schroeder "A Dynamic Perspective on the Impact of Process Innovation Upon Competitive
Strategies," Strategic Management Journal 11, no. 1 (Jan 1990), pg 37
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Product Innovation
Process Innovation
Product Maturity
Figure 1 Innovation through Product Maturity0
Typically, the rate of product innovation is high in the preliminary stages of development
where all facets of the system need to be defined. This phase of development is termed
the fluid phase due to the ever changing nature of the product design. A large amount of
resources are expended during this early stage focusing on defining product standards,
architecture, etc.
In the course of their research, Utterback and Abernathy "observed that this flurry or
radical product innovation eventually ends with the emergence of a dominant design.""
A dominant design, in their terms, refers to the development of standard customer
expectations on product performance, aesthetics, and capabilities; parameters that
determine a product's competitive standing in the market. This phase of development is
named the transitional phase as the myriad of technologies begin to shift toward the
dominant design. The graphical representation of the Abernathy-Utterback model depicts
the high rate of product innovation for a new product followed by a sharp rate decrease
once a dominant design emerges. Once a design becomes dominant, there are relatively
fewer areas of a product's design that require innovation and product design efforts shift
- 17-
10 Utterback, pg 91
" Utterback, pg 81
to incremental development. "As obvious improvements [to product design] are
introduced, it becomes increasingly difficult to better past performance." 12 The last phase
of development is the specific phase since most product development efforts converge on
one dominant design. An industry with a dominant design, such as the automobile, is
considered mature.
Abernathy and Utterback similarly characterized the historical rate of process innovation
to the product's maturity level. In the fluid phase of development, minimal product
definition precludes the ability to innovate new processes. "During the formative period
of a new product technology, the processes used to produce it are usually crude [and]
inefficient."13 As the product design stabilizes, it facilitates the ability to identify specific
areas of process innovation to target. The transitional phase is characterized largely by
advancements in process technology. As customers begin to accept a new product or
technology, they grow to expect a certain level of performance from this product. The
formation of a dominant design changes the nature of competition. Companies cannot
rely solely on product differentiation to remain competitive. Customer preferences shift
to issues of quality and price driven largely by manufacturing and process advancements.
"Manufacturing skill shows up in many areas that customer notice in one way or another:
quality of fit and finish, the rate at which new models come out, the time it takes for a
custom order to be built and delivered and product durability and reliability.""
It is in this transitional phase of development that product innovation and process
innovations become tightly linked. As products reach maturity in the specific phase of
development, the opportunity for advancements in process technology decreases and the
rate of process innovation stabilizes. In this latter phase, product and process
technologies are closely integrated and it is prohibitively expensive to drastically alter
either one. "Changes in process technology can have a significant impact on product
characteristics. Conversely, minor changes in product design specifications can require
12 Utterback, pg 82
13 Utterback, pg 82
14 Daniel H. Whitney and Charles Fine, "Is the Make-Buy Decision Process a Core Competence?" MIT
Center for Technology, Policy, and Industrial Development (1996), pg 6.
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the development of completely new process technologies." H
interdependence allows for firms not only to maintain product innovation-based
competitiveness, but also to improve its product innovative abilities in the future.16 One
of the major critics of the Abernathy-Utterback model is that it limits high rates of
process innovation to the transitional phase of development.17 There is a large potential
for process innovation to positively impact the product innovations during the fluid
phase, without the constraints of established product characteristics. A subsequent
section on process innovation will discuss the number of benefits that companies can
achieve
Abernathy and Utterback extend their model of product and process innovation. Table I
summarizes how a variety of factors shift from the fluid to the transitional to the specific
phase.
Product From high variety, to dominant design, to
incremental innovation on standardized products
Process Manufacturing progresses from heavy reliance on
skilled labor and general-purpose equipment to
specialized equipment tended by low-skilled labor
Organization From entrepreneurial organic firm to hierarchical
mechanistic firm with defined tasks and procedures
and few rewards for radical innovation
Market From fragmented and unstable with diverse
products and rapid feedback to commodity-like with
largely undifferentiated products
Competition From many small firms with unique products to an
oligopoly of firms with similar products
Table 1 Enterprise Level Shift through Phases of Developments
15 Gary P. Pisano, "Learning-Before-Doing in the Development of New Process Technology," Research
Policy 25 (1996), pg 1099.
16 Masaaki Kotabe and Janet Y. Murray. "Linking Product and Process Innovations and Modes of
International Sourcing in Global Competition: A Case of Foreign Multinational Firms" Journal of
International Business Studies 21, no. 3 (1990), pg 389.
17 Gary P. Pisano, The Development Factory: Unlocking the Potential of Process Innovation. (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1997), pg 7-8.
18 Utterback, pg 91
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owever this
Abernathy and Utterback use their research to describe how a company can use this
framework to manage the innovation of technology across the enterprise through the
changes of innovation. Subsequent sections of this thesis describe enterprise level
changes necessary at Raytheon Missile Systems to effectively manage manufacturing
innovation.
Historically, it is rarely the leading firm in one generation of technology to develop the
next generation. "Most industry-shattering innovations do not spring from the
established competitors in an industry but from new firms or from established firms
entering a new arena."19 Utterback's main premise is that the leader in one generation of
technology focuses intently on further developing that technology that they are
unprepared for the next leap in technology.
"The most obvious explanation for the demise of established leaders in an
industry would be that they have skills in the old product or process
technology, while the entrepreneurial firms have a base in the
new... [however] the differences in technological resources do not much
discriminate between invading and traditional firms in an industry. Most
threatened firms do participate in the new technology and often have
preeminent positions in it. The basic problem seems to be that they
continue to make their heaviest commitments to the old."2
It is also possible for a leading firm to be hesitant and wary of developing new
technologies in-house that will cause their core technology to become obsolete.
In addition, "the lethargy of well-established competitors in a product market in the face
of potentially disruptive innovation is that they face increasing constraints from the
growing web of relationships bringing product and process change together."
Increasing the challenge for existing leaders to generate new technology, "Christiansen
has shown that customer for entrenched products can influence a firm not to change when
change is called for, increasing [the company's] resistance and vulnerability to
-20-
'9 Utterback, pg xxvii
20 Utterback, pg 194
21 Utterback, pg xxvii
technological progress."2 2  The leading firm is caught unprepared and is forced to
scramble to catch up. "Innovations shift competitive advantage when rivals either
perceive a new way of competing or are unwilling or unable to respond."
1.2.3. Innovation in a Manufacturing Context
Academic research on manufacturing innovation is fairly recent. The manufacturing
environment has not seen much new, widespread, technological advancement. One of
the leading researchers of manufacturing innovation, Gary Pisano, has studied
manufacturing development within the pharmaceutical industry and generalized his
theories to apply to other industries.
Table 2 details the different emphasis that manufacturing development acquires
depending on the rate of product and process innovation.
22 Utterback, pg 29
23 Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Maintaining Superior Performance, (New York:
Free Press, 1985), 45-47
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Process Driven
" Commodity Chemicals
* Steel
" Paper
Process development focuses on
cost reduction.
High
4-4
Low
* Apparel
* Processed food
* Shipbuilding
Process development focuses on
cost reduction.
Process Enabling
" Pharmaceuticals/Biotechnology
" Specialty chemicals
* Semiconductors
* Advanced materials
" High-precision, miniature
electronic goods
Process development focuses
on solving complex technical
problems, rapid time to
market, and fast ramp-up.
Product Driven
S
0
S
S
Software
Entertainment
Workstation computers
Assembled products
Either little process development or
a focus on design for
manufacturability.
High
Rate of Product Innovation
Table 2 Relationship between Product and Process Innovation2
The design of products and systems that face a low rate of product innovation has
reached the stable phase of development. Pisano labels these types of products as
material and process driven. Manufacturing developments in these types of products
typically entail incremental improvements of existing manufacturing tools, processes
and techniques to reduce production costs. Of products and systems with a high rate of
product innovation, there are those with a low rate of process innovation. These product
driven industries have stable and well-known manufacturing processes.
Process development is focused in the design phase of development to improve, modify
or simplify the design to match the existing manufacturing capabilities. Further
development of these products and system typically involve design for manufacturability
24 Pisano (1997), pg 10
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Mature
Low
tools suited to making product designs compatible with current process capabilities.25
"Research aimed at finding ways to improve manufacturability has led to greater
understanding of the power of the design and development processes to affect
manufacturing performance." 26
The final category of products and systems are labeled as process enabling. These have a
high rate of both product and process innovation. As new products are designed, they are
continually in need of new manufacturing capabilities and require a high degree of
process development and innovation to be able to produce the system. The focus of this
research involves an industry that requires process-enabling technology. Even with a
reduced rate of product innovation, "the appearance of a dominant design shifts the
competitive emphasis in favor of those firms - large or small - that are able to achieve
greater skills in process innovation and integration and with more highly developed
internal technical and engineering skills. Once the dust has settled on the contest for
product innovation, then competitive engagement shifts to a new battleground: process
innovation." 27
Process-enabling products require a new model for the role of manufacturing within the
product development cycle and throughout the life of the product. Traditional
development engages manufacturing near the end of the design phase and is known for
the design teams throwing the design "over the wall" to the manufacturing teams.
"Experience in a variety of industries suggests that a significant fraction (as much as 80
percent in some cases) of total product cost is established during the product engineering
stage of development."28 Pisano focused his research on process enabling products and
created the following chart to detail the major differences between the traditional model
and a new model for manufacturing development within a company.
25 Pisano (1997), pg 9
26 Clark & Fujimoto, pg 3
27 Utterback, pg 30
28 Clark & Fujimoto, 3 as a reference to the following articles: L. Soderberg, Facing Up to the Engineering
Gap, The McKinsey Quarterly (Spring, 1989) & R. Jaikumar, Postindustrial Mfg, HBS (11 to 12/1986).
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Conventional Model New Model
Primary Goals Reduce manufacturing costs Proactive support of timely,
of existing products efficient, and high-quality
launches of new products
Technical focus 0 Incremental process * Exploration/development
improvement of new process
* New capacity/ architectures needed for
equipment/automation new product designs
* Troubleshooting
* Product modifications
for enhanced
manufacturability
Product Peripheral * Central
Development * Process developers as
Role/Influence core members of product
development teams
Customer Plant * Plant
_ R&D
Key Capabilities * Process Engineering * Process science
" In-depth knowledge of * Ability to anticipate
current manufacturing future manufacturing
environment requirements
* Minimize product * Responsiveness to
disruptions project level uncertainty
Learning Maximize learning curve Capture learning across
within product/process product/process generations
generations
Metrics of Improvements in yield, * Improvements in initial
Performance cost, quality, and capital yield, cost, quality, and
over the life of a product capital across products
* Lead time, efficiency,
quality
Table 3 Two Models of Process Development 29
Table 3 differentiates between the status quo and the direction that companies should be
headed in to develop new manufacturing capabilities. "Evidence is mounting that
effective design and development of new products have a significant impact on cost,
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29 Pisano (1997), 290
quality, customer satisfaction, and competitive advantage."30 Particularly important to
note is the development of new manufacturing technologies results in improvements
across the entire product development cycle as well as through the production and
delivery of the product. "The challenges and opportunities [for process development] run
deeper than ensuring compatibility of product and process design, or achieving
manufacturability. Process development represents a technically difficult and
organizationally complex undertaking in its own right."
1.2.4. Purpose of Manufacturing Innovation
This section attempts to explain the importance of developing new manufacturing
capabilities and attempts to itemize and justify investment in manufacturing innovation.
"Real leverage comes from an aggressive pursuit of process technology changes rather
than a simple focus on operating existing technology better to increase volume and boost
capacity utilization."3 Many industries are exposed to a multitude of different factors
that support and drive the adoption of new models of development. There is an
increasing complexity of product technology, minimal sustainable competitive advantage
and shorter product life cycles. By investing in manufacturing innovation early in the
product development cycle, a company can generate a number of competitive benefits:
* Difficult to copy manufacturing technologies
* Longer more sustainable competitive advantage
* Develop sophisticated technical problem-solving capabilities
* Capability to push the envelope of both product and process technology
* Decreases time to market
* Faster manufacturing ramp-up
* Reduces risk and complexity of development
* Provide technical degrees of freedom for product design benefits33
30 Clark & Fujimoto, 1
31 Pisano (1997), 9
32 Gary P. Pisano and Steven C. Wheelwright, "The New Logic of High Tech R&D," Harvard Business
Review 73. no. 5 (1995), pg 101.
3 Pisano (1997), 17
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In addition, "although superior process development can reduce manufacturing costs, in
itself an important dimension of competition, the power of process development more
often lies in how it helps companies achieve accelerated time to market, rapid production
ramp-up, enhanced customer acceptance of new products, and a stronger proprietary
position."34
Unfortunately, many companies are blindly following a policy to outsource different
components as well as the manufacturing equipment used to build products in house.
While outsourcing components could potentially result in the loss of a key link to control
the product design and supply chain35, outsourcing the manufacturing equipment results
in the loss of internal skills to develop manufacturing processes. More damaging is that
if other companies in the same industry are also outsourcing their manufacturing
equipment, competitors end up with the same 'cookie cutter' technology available to
everyone else. Hence, it becomes much easier and faster for competitors to imitate a
product if the process technology used is readily available. 36 "Proprietary processes are
just as formidable competitive weapons as proprietary products, and more enduring
competitive barriers are created when a firm couples product innovation with process
",37innovation.
1.2.5. Challenges in Manufacturing Innovation
Manufacturing innovation can be a difficult and challenging concept to understand, let
alone to use as a competitive advantage. "The barriers to using process development as
an effective competitive weapon in companies that have been primarily product driven
are subtle, complex, and deeply embedded in both the formal and the informal structure
14 Pisano (1997), pg 11
31 Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage. (Reading,
MA: Perseus Books, 1998), refer to clockspeed and the "Intel inside" dilemma that started with IBM and
began outsourcing all components, including those that resulted critical in today's market forcing IBM to
lose power in the industry.
36 Pisano (1997), pg 18
1 Hayes and Wheelwright, pg 18
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of the organization." 38 In their study of the automotive industry, Clark & Fujimoto
outline the seemingly different environments within manufacturing and research &
development. The traditional argument to explain those differences is that "effective
production management [requires] stability, efficiency, discipline, and tight control
whereas effective R&D management requires dynamism, flexibility, creativity, and loose
control." 3 9 This argument underlies why different groups manage the two different
functions in diametrically opposed ways. "Lacking balance and integration among all
essential factors means that by investing heavily in one area, a firm could allow its
competitors to exploit the new product or process technology first."4
Coordination and collaboration between the two major communities requires a close
understanding of their new roles and responsibilities. "Product engineering must
comprehend implications of their designs for manufacturability, and process engineering
must clarify constraints and opportunities in the process and develop a good measure of
flexibility to cope with the changes inherent in the product design process."4 ' The push
for manufacturing innovation requires early involvement in the product development
stages. "The effects of process development are cumulative - the earlier a company
undertakes process development, the greater the total financial return. Conversely, the
longer a company waits to initiate process development, the less incentive there is to do
SO."4 2
It is important to note that the development of new manufacturing technologies typically
has a longer development time. Companies that are pursuing manufacturing innovation
should be conscious of the process development cycle and begin manufacturing
innovation early in the development of the product design to be able to deliver both the
product and the process. This extended development cycle time can be attributed to a
number of factors. Primarily, most companies have a limited degree of experience in
38 Henderson et al, pg 3
39 Clark & Fujimoto, pg 1684 0 Utterback, pg xxi
41 Clark & Fujimoto, pg 123
42 Pisano and Wheelwright, pg 101
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developing new manufacturing processes and conducting manufacturing research. There
is an inherent lack of skills to quickly and efficiently develop new processes. In addition,
there is higher complexity in manufacturing innovation, in part due to the constant shift
of the product design.
A number of issues regarding effective manufacturing innovation require significant
changes to the organization and culture that surrounds development work within a
company. Subsequent sections will detail the challenges faced in promoting
organizational change.
1.3. Organizational Change
Research on organizations and their ability to change spans many decades and covers a
myriad of theories. Often researchers focus their efforts on specific aspects of
organizational change such as teams, stakeholders, leadership skills, culture, etc. While
many different aspects of implementing change are studied and just as many possible
solutions are offered, there is one definite conclusion: change is difficult and there is no
magic formula to guarantee effective change. "Change is extraordinarily difficult, and
the fact that it occurs successfully at all is something of a miracle. Change is furthered,
however, if and when an organization can strike a delicate balance among the key players
in the process."
1.3.1. Implementing Change
One of the biggest challenges researches face in studying organizational change is the
inability to prove their theories since it is impossible to isolate the organization and the
different factors an organization is exposed to while undergoing change. "We are not yet,
in this field [of corporate culture], at the stage of having hard hypotheses to test, and
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43 Ancona, et al, module 8, core pg. 12.
perhaps we never will be."44 Even from the organization's point of view, the process of
implementing change is difficult to apply in isolation. "No matter how carefully the
leaders prepare for change, and no matter how realistic and committed they are, there will
always be factors outside of their control that may have a profound impact on the success
of the change process. Those external, uncontrollable, and powerful forces are not to be
underestimated, and they are one reason why some researchers have questioned the
manageability of change at all.
Research on organizations implementing change is fragmented and includes a multitude
of theories and schools of thought with a multitude of case studies and different
suggestions for effective implementation. Difficulties in implementing change involve
the organization, its culture, the stakeholders and the leaders involved in the process.
However, "any action that disturbs the organizational status quo or represents a threat to
an individual's habitual way of doing things is likely to provoke defensive, and often
counterproductive, behaviors."46 To implement change effectively, it is not only
important to identify what within an organization should be changed but also to identify
who will be affected by the change and whose support will ultimately be critical in its
diffusion and its success.47  Identifying the stakeholders and "understanding how
recipients perceive the change and how they experience it" 48 is a critical step to
effectively implementing change.
In implementing change, "culture matters because it is a powerful, latent, and often
unconscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective behavior,
ways of perceiving, thought patterns and values." 49 The effectiveness of a company's
culture is largely dependent on the competitive environment and whether or not the
44 Edgar H. Schein, The Corporate Culture Survival Guide: Sense and Nonsense about Culture Change.
(San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1999), pg xvi.
4' Ancona, et al, module 8, core pg. 14-16.
46 Ancona, et al, module 8, core pg. 14.
4' Ancona, et al, module 8, core pg. 17
48 Ancona, et al, module 8, core pg. 19
49 Schein, pg 14
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culture is aligned with the company's strategy.50 "The essence of culture [is] jointly
learned values, beliefs, and assumptions that become shared and taken for granted as the
organization continues to be successful."" However, as the environment changes, the
same assumptions and culture may not be successful. In an older company, the
organization's culture has stabilized and changing involves having to unlearn a portion of
the old culture to learn about the new one. Additionally, in a more mature organization,
"it is more difficult to decipher the culture and make people aware of it because it is so
embedded in routines."5 2
The challenge in dealing with change on an individual level is that people prefer familiar
environments. They "do not like chaotic, unpredictable situations and work hard to
stabilize and 'normalize' them. Any prospective culture change therefore launches
massive amounts of anxiety and resistance to change." 3 Edgar Schein, researcher on
organizational culture, believes that while people "can be coerced into changing their
overt behavior, [it] is not stable unless the deeper levels undergo some kind of
transformation."5 4 A subsequent section will address a number of steps that can be taken
to overcome this individual resistance to being changed.
1.3.2. The Learning Organization
Very closely tied to the need for manufacturing innovation are studies of the environment
that would best suit innovation. "Today, when competitiveness hinges on the ability to
develop or adapt new technologies in products, services, and processes, understanding the
dynamics of industrial innovation and change is essential for survival and success."5 5 For
innovation in manufacturing to occur, a radical shift in thinking is required to overcome
the current mindset of manufacturing as a support function. "The organizations that will
truly excel in the future will be the organizations that discover how to tap people's
50 Schein, pg 24
" Schein, pg 20
12 Schein, pg 143
3 Schein, pg 26
1 Schein, pg 115-116
s Utterback, pg xiv.
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commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization."56 It is that spirit of
enthusiasm and commitment that will establish manufacturing innovation and create a
competitive advantage for a company.
"To avoid the grim reaper that has carried off so many proud and prosperous firms over
the past century, modern managers must develop and nourish organizational capabilities
that will carry them successfully from one generation of product and process technology
to the next. This may be the ultimate managerial challenge."5 7 Senge believes that 'in
the long run, the only sustainable source of competitive advantage is your organization's
ability to learn faster than its competition."5 8 By learning faster, a company is able to
respond and adapt to changes quickly. To garner these learning benefits, he believes a
company should transform themselves into a learning organization. Senge has focused
his research on learning organizations and defines these as organizations "where people
continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and
expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and
where people are continually learning how to learn together." 59
In defining a learning organization, Senge identifies five major disciplines that will create
an organization that is capable of learning. The five disciplines are systems thinking,
personal mastery, mental models, building shared vision, and team learning. Systems
thinking is a high level understanding of system dynamics, a relatively young field of
study that attempts to describe and understand entire systems and interactions of multiple
different factors. System Dynamics hopes to provide additional perspective to decision
makers to allow them to see the long-term consequences and repercussions of their
actions. A subsequent section in this chapter describes in further detail the concept of
System Dynamics and systems level thinking. Personal mastery refers to "continually
clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing
56 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization. (New York:
Currency Doubleday, 1990), pg 3-4
57 Utterback, pg xix.
58 Senge, front flap
'9 Senge, front flap
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patience, and of seeing reality objectively."60 Senge believes that a commitment between
an organization and an individual is necessary to engender growth and learning for the
individual that is gradually transferred to the organization.61
The term, mental models, is also obtained from system dynamics. A mental model is an
individual or group's perception of their environment. In Senge's words, "mental models
are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations or even pictures or images that
influence how we understand the world and how we take action."62 Building a shared
vision is a straightforward concept. Its application within the learning organization refers
to uniting people to pursue a common goal and share the same destiny.63 Finally, team
learning is crucial in a learning organization to ensure that the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts.
"We know that teams can learn; in sports, in the performing arts, in
science, and even, occasionally, in business, there are striking examples
where the intelligence of the team exceeds the intelligence of the
individuals in the team, and where teams develop extraordinary capacities
for coordinated action. When teams are truly learning, not only are they
producing extraordinary results but the individual members are growing
more rapidly than could have occurred otherwise.""
In other words, teams have the ability to learn above and beyond their individual
capabilities, generating additional benefits for a learning organization.
To create a learning organization, a number of changes are required to encourage
learning. "Traditionally, organizations attempt to surmount the difficulty of coping with
the breadth of impact from decisions by breaking themselves up into components. They
institute functional hierarchies that are easier for people to 'get their hands around."' 65
Now, there is a basic need for coordination to raise the level of awareness and optimize
60 Senge, pg 7
61 Senge, pg 8
62 Senge, pg 8
63 Senge, pg 9
64 Senge, pg 10
65 Senge, pg 24
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everyone's efforts across the entire enterprise. "When people in organizations focus only
on their position, they have little sense of responsibility for the results produced when all
positions interact.66 In this new competitive environment, a company can remain
competitive by finding systematic "ways to bring people together to develop the best
possible mental models for facing any situation at hand."67
Also, a new type of environment is required that engenders explorations and innovation.
Trying new things to find creative solutions often means traveling out of a comfort zone
and it is important to create a challenging and nurturing environment that is safe for
people to think differently and make mistakes along the way without fear of repercussion.
1.3.3. System Dynamics
Systems level thinking is a systematic attempt to view and understand the world as a
complex system where everything is interrelated. System Dynamics is a management
tool used to identify major sources of conflict in the system, to effectively implement
change by identifying high leverage points and to design better operating policies with
both the short term effects and long term consequences in mind.
"We each have a 'learning horizon,' a breadth of vision in time and space
within which we assess our effectiveness. When our actions have
consequences beyond our learning horizon, it becomes impossible to learn
from direct experience. Herein lies the core learning dilemma that
confronts organizations: we learn best from experience but we never
directly ex erience the consequences of many of our most important
decisions."
System Dynamics provides a way to overcome that learning horizon and lows
practitioners to see the "interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect chains, and [see]
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66 Senge, pg 19
67 Senge, pg 181
68 Senge, pg 23
processes of change rather than snapshots ."69 Additional descriptions to understand
system dynamics and causal loop diagrams are included in Section 4.4 and Appendix A.
"The bottom line of systems thinking is leverage - seeing where actions and changes in
structures can lead to significant, enduring improvements. Often, leverage follows the
principle of economy of means: where the best results come not from large-scale efforts
but from small well-focused actions."70 Senge warns change agents and leaders to
"beware of the symptomatic solution. Solutions that address only the symptoms of a
problem, not fundamental causes, tend to have short-term benefits at best. In the long
term, the problem resurfaces and there is increased pressure for symptomatic response.
Meanwhile, the capability for fundamental solutions can atrophy." Often, "it is much
easier to draw on the strengths of the culture than to overcome the constraints by
changing the culture."72
1.4. Thesis Organization
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the internship project and details the academic
research applicable to the key thesis topics. Chapter 2 is an effort to define the defense
industry characteristics and the external driving forces to validate the need for
manufacturing innovation. Chapter 3 describes the Raytheon Company, including its
history, to understand the entire enterprise. The specific business unit in this study was
characterized using various tools - Three lenses, System Dynamics - to identify and
prepare to overcome the socialization challenges that arise from implementing change.
Chapter 4 defines the vision and goals of the new center, the Advanced Manufacturing
Development Center, and includes a more detailed account of the current operating
culture and procedures of RMS to understand how efforts to develop new manufacturing
capabilities will affect the organization.
69 Senge, pg 73
70 Senge, pg 114
7 Senge, pg. 105
72 Schein, pg 87
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Chapter 5 describes the benchmarking efforts undertaken to understand how other
companies manage manufacturing innovation. Chapter 6 details the operational model
developed for the AMDC, including the operation of a Manufacturing Technology
Strategy Committee and of the teams that will be developing the new manufacturing
technology. Chapter 7 describes the progress of the implementation and development of
the AMDC into the organization with recommendations for improvement and
conclusions drawn throughout the research project. In addition, suggestions for
additional avenues for research both in an academic sense as well as in the practical
application of research ideas within the company. Although the research is specific to the
defense industry, generic problems and conclusions are drawn that are applicable to other
industries.
1.5. Chapter Summary
This first chapter introduces the project that served as a basis for this thesis. The majority
of the chapter focused on presenting the academic research to define and validate the
need to (1) effectively manage the change process, (2) innovate within the manufacturing
environment and (3) create a learning organization for effective innovation. The research
presents a basis to effectively implement change by thinking strategically about the
change process, taking the organizational context into consideration and identifying the
critical socialization issues that ensue. The results of this research are basic awareness of
the fact that change is difficult. Viewing the enterprise as a whole permits a global-level
understanding of the needs and benefits of manufacturing innovation. Finally, the
management of technology and innovation is complex and requires an appropriate
environment for optimal effectiveness.
- 35 -
This page intentionally left blank.
-36-
Chapter 2 Defense Industry
This chapter describes the defense industry to provide a general context of the
competitive environment and describe the unique challenges that companies in this
industry face. Researchers believe that to implement change in the product development
cycle, "it is essential that we understand the linkages of product technologies with
manufacturing process, corporate organization and strategy and the structure and
dynamics of an industry."73 This chapter also identifies the changes occurring within the
defense industry that are external driving forces for companies to adopt manufacturing
innovation research in their product development efforts.
For the purpose of this research, the defense industry includes companies that
manufacture guided missiles, defense electronics, military aircraft, naval vessels, and
corresponding parts, and other related defense components and systems, as well as
companies that provide services such as military system integration, repair, and
maintenance.74 This thesis focuses primarily on the major US defense companies and
their presence within the local US environment while including their product sales to
international customers. The major US defense companies are those that produce large
systems and are often primary contractors.
2.1. Porter's Industry Dynamics
Michael Porter presents a systematic framework to evaluate an industry by taking a closer
look at the strength or power yielded by the various existing and potential players and
factors. Porter created this framework to think about the five major forces that affect
industry dynamics. He believes that understanding the dynamics within an industry will
allow existing competitors to evaluate their position in the industry, determine if they are
able to remain competitive, and evaluate the supply chain to determine if there are other
73 Utterback, pg xxi
7 Hoover's On-line - Aerospace & Defense Sector Description paraphrased to include only defense
(accessed December 2002); available on www.hoovers.com.
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profitable areas to pursue within the industry. In addition, an analysis of the Five Forces
allows members of the supply chain to evaluate their competitive position as well as to
allow potential entrants to determine the probability of successfully entering a particular
area of an industry. Finally, characterizing the forces can help determine how an industry
will respond to the introduction of a new product or a new business model. The five
forces, Competitors, Customers, Suppliers, Threat of Entry and Substitutes, are illustrated
in Figure 2 below.
Suppliers
Threat of IProduct
New Entrants CmeiosSubstitutes
Customers
Figure 2 Porter's Five Forces
To begin the analysis, a definition of the defense industry is required and is described
earlier in the chapter. The five forces of the industry were identified and the dynamics
that defense companies face were characterized.
2.1.1. Customers
The primary customers in the defense industry are the US government and the major
military branches: Army, Navy, and Air Force. For this analysis, international customers
are not considered as a separate entity since all international sales are subjected to the
approval and authorization of the US government and therefore have a similar, albeit
more complicated, relationship.
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The customers of the defense industry exert a large amount of control on all of the
stakeholders. Multiple facets of the US government affect all aspects of product
acquisition from new product and technology development to the purchase of available
products to the creation of policies that determine the number and type of suppliers that
must be involved. "The funding of U.S. government programs is subject to
Congressional authorization and appropriation. While Congress generally appropriates
funds on a fiscal year basis, major defense programs are usually conducted under binding
contracts over multiple years, which provides a level of continuity uncommon to many
industries." 75
As mentioned earlier, the customer controls all sales, foreign and domestic, effectively
controlling the fate of every defense company in their decisions. The customer has
recognized the disadvantage they are in when compared to customer expectations in other
industries. To rectify the situation, the customer is working with defense companies to
implement lean principles to reduce both development and production costs of defense
systems.
2.1.1.1. Lean Efforts
The Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI)76 is a collaborative effort comprised of MIT,
representing the academic institution, industry representatives, as aerospace product
design representatives, and U.S. military officers representing the interests of the
customer. LAI is a forum for discussing industry changes and addressing the problems
facing the different stakeholders to find common, practical solutions for all stakeholders.
One major initiative undertaken by LAI during the course of this research was a
commitment by the U.S. Air Force to apply lean principles to the acquisition process.
Their primary objectives are to simplify the acquisition process and reduce costs both
' Raytheon Company 2002 Annual Report, (accessed March 2003); available on
http://www.raytheon.com/finance/annrpt.htmi, pg 2.
76 MIT Lean Aerospace Initiative (accessed October 2002); available on http://lean.mit.edu/.
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inherent in the process and in development. In addition, leaning out the process should
reduce the amount of time currently required to make development and production
decisions as well to reduce the product development timeline.
2.1.1.2. Acquisition Process
Defense is a highly regulated industry. As its primary customer, the U.S. government has
a detailed Defense Acquisition Management Framework through which all acquisitions
are managed. The framework is shown graphically below in Figure 3.
User Needs & Technology
Opportunities o Process Entry at Milestones A,
* Entrance criteria met before ent
* Evolutionary Acquisition or Sin
Capability
(Program Initial Operational
A B Initiation) C Capability
Concept & System Development Production & Deployment
Technology & Demonstration Low Rate Initial Full Rate
Development ritical Production/ ProductionDesign Operational Test Decision
Review & Evaluation Review
Pre-Systems Systems Acquisition
Acquisition
3, or C
ering phase
gle Step to Full
Full Operational
Capability
Operations &
Support
Sustainment
Figure 3 Defense Acquisition Management Framework; The 5000 Mode 77
The framework provides a high level overview of the different types of programs the
government can fund. There are three major points where the customer can begin a new
acquisition, denoted above as Milestones A, B, and C. From the customer's point of
view, acquisition begins with either the identification of customer needs or of new
technology opportunities.
77 Department of Defense, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," Defense Acquisition University,
October 30, 2002 (accessed on November 2002); available on http://dod5000.dau.mil/ (Note: all
government personnel involved in the acquisition process must be certified by the Defense Acquisition
University.)
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Typically, the government can notify defense companies of their needs at each milestone.
Each company decides whether or not to submit a proposal for development or
production work as requested by the customer. Once a bid is submitted, the government
evaluates each proposal based on a set of entrance criteria and the company's credibility
in meeting the system requirements. The customer then awards the contract to either one
or multiple companies.
Milestone A, shown above, initiates the Pre-System Acquisition process. During Pre-
System Acquisition the customer funds concept and technology development. At this
point, defense companies primarily create top-level designs, define the overall system
performance requirements and identify major technologies that will be used. In addition,
companies perform trade studies to validate a particular technology or its application to
meet the customer's needs. Particularly when granting funds for early development
work, the customer is likely to fund several companies in parallel through the earlier
phases of development.
Milestone B is the official program initiation. A contract that begins at Milestone B is
either a continuation of work done in a previous contract or uses proven, existing
technology for product or system development. This phase of the process is considered
the beginning of Systems Acquisition. A company that is granted a System Development
and Demonstration contract undergoes a critical design review where they must
demonstrate the technology and current design meet the customer's requirements. Only
if the critical design review is successful will the program enter the next phase:
Production and Deployment.
Milestone C continues the System Acquisition portion of the process but requires
companies to demonstrate the initial operational capabilities of the system. Programs in
this phase begin low rate initial production, primarily to conduct operational tests and
evaluate system performance. In addition, a major review of this phase determines
whether or not a company can begin full rate production of the system. The final phase
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of the acquisition process is termed sustainment. Products or system design in this phase
have been developed to their full operational capability. Contracts that begin at
Milestone C typically involve an order for the delivery of existing systems with minimal
if any design changes. Because the system and technology are proven, there is no need
for additional reviews in this case. Aside from additional production volumes,
sustainment contracts involve customer service and support, spare parts and repair.
Due to the nature and funding of development contracts, the government effectively owns
all development work. The customer has the ability to fund a company to develop a
design and then pass it on to another company for manufacturing. For example, the
customer can grant Company X a research contract to develop a design using a new
technology and then grant a production contract to Company Y using the work of
Company X as a blueprint. The resulting competitive environment means that having the
capability to design great products does not guarantee that the contract to manufacture
and deliver the products will be awarded to that company. It is important to note that
defense companies generate a majority of their profits through the sale of hardware rather
than its development. Therefore, "the ability to make things rapidly and efficiently - to
transform materials into parts, components, and assemblies - is a critical source of
advantage in product development."8
2.1.1.3. Better Faster Cheaper
The aerospace and defense industry is caught up in a wave of Better, Faster, Cheaper, a
term coined in the early 90's to describe a shift in the development requirements within
the industry. 79 For several decades, the Cold War largely shaped the environment for
defense companies. Globally, this era was "characterized by technologically
sophisticated superpowers dominating the world's geopolitical forces."80 The result
78 Clark and Fujimoto, pg 167.
79 Earll M. Murman, Myles Walton and Eric Rebentisch, "Challenges in the Better, Faster, Cheaper Era of
Aeronautical Design, Engineering and Manufacturing," Lean Aerospace Initiative, September 2000
(accessed August 2002); available in http://lean.mit.edu, 2.
80 Murman, et al, pg 1.
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during this era of competitive development was a dominant emphasis on pushing product
performance "Higher, Farther, Faster" than ever before with little regard to the
development costs or timeline. Consequently, "improvements to design, development
and manufacturing were given lower priority".8 1
The end of the Cold War brought about a new paradigm to the defense industry of
"Better, Faster, Cheaper" summarizing the increasing demands of customers within the
industry. "Better, Faster, Cheaper" pushes defense companies to continue to create better
products by pushing the envelope in their technology and performance while at the same
time developing and delivering those products at afaster rate and cheaper development
and production costs. This need for improved development and production is especially
critical in generating flexible organizations that can respond to changing customer needs.
The threats facing today's military are transforming from a single known threat that
characterized the Cold War era to a myriad of terrorist groups with a minimal information
available to characterize the threat.
2.1.2. Competitors
The push for Better, Faster, Cheaper represents a shift in the capabilities required for
defense companies to remain competitive. Companies cannot rely on their product and
technology development capabilities as their sole source of competitive advantage.
Better, Faster Cheaper summarizes the customer's high level requirements and drives
defense companies to excel at rapid product development and technology innovation at a
competitive cost.
Massive consolidation in the last decade within the industry has formed giant players, the
top four being: Lockheed Martin Corporation, The Boeing Company, Northrop
Grumman, & Raytheon Company. Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta and acquired
General Electric's aerospace unit. Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglass and
purchased the satellite division of Hughes Electronics. Northrop merged with Grumman,
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recently acquired Litton Industries and Newport News and is in the process of acquiring
TRW's aerospace and defense units, the fifth largest defense company. Raytheon
acquired Hughes Electronics' defense unit, E-Systems, and the defense and missiles
division of Texas Instruments.
As mentioned earlier, the customer takes into account a company's reputation and track
record in awarding a contract. The major defense contractors have established their
reputation through years of developing and delivering products to the customer. There is
a large incentive for the existing players to keep others out of the defense industry. The
industry giants have the resources to protect their position within their markets.
Major defense products are sold as entire systems where the customer commits to the
entire system architecture. Upgrading subsystems to include the latest technology is
significantly more economical than switching to a new system since the costs to switch
from an established system to another are exorbitantly high. High switching costs are
incurred in having to change the existing mounting architecture, provide new user
training and develop new software systems to name a few. Subsystem upgrades create
product families that reinforce incremental development.
In addition, major systems such as fighter planes remain in use for decades. For example,
the F15 made by McDonnell Douglas now Boeing, had its maiden flight in 1972.82 The
basic architecture of the F15 has expanded the product family to include five models,
from A to E for the US Air Force. The latest version, the F 1 5E Strike Eagle, was first
delivered in 1988 and current contracts schedule production to continue through 2004.83
The U.S. Air Force and Boeing have a plan to sustain the F-15 at least through 2030.84 In
addition, development of the F 1 5J is under a licensing agreement to Japan 5 and Boeing
82 US Airforce Fact Sheet, FI5E Strike Eagle (accessed February 2003); available on
http://www.lakenheath.af.mil/Mission-historv/F- I 5E.htm.
83 Boeing F15K Fact Sheet (accessed February 2003); available on http://www.boeinu.com/defense-
space/military/fl 5/f- 15k/f l5kfacts.htm.
84 Boeing F15K Fact Sheet (accessed February 2003); available on littp://www.boeini.com/defense-
space/military/fl 5/f-I 5k/fl 5kfacts.htni, accessed February 2003.
85 Boeing F15 Fact Sheet (accessed February 2003); available on http://ustihhter.tripod.com/fI5.htm.
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is developing the F15K for the Republic of Korea . This extremely long product
lifetime results in additional revenue opportunities for defense companies as they can
offer system upgrades for the life of the product. Conversely, this also requires that
companies provide support to the customer over the product's useful life.
While the government places stringent requirements on defense companies it also
provides a high degree of insulation from external forces. One of the main drivers for the
resurgence of manufacturing within US manufacturing companies was intense
international competition, particularly notorious in the automotive industry. However,
there exists a strong need, based on national security concerns, for the US government to
purchase its defense needs from US companies. An underlying belief that the United
States military forces should maintain its superiority in weapons and defense technology
leads to the continual funding of US defense companies to develop state of the art
systems. "Sustained government investments were made [during the Cold War] in
aerospace research, development and technology to assure that the technological
capability of the country was superior to the enemy's capability."8 7  US defense
contractors are effectively sheltered from foreign competition within the US market.
However, foreign defense companies compete with US defense products and systems in
the international market.
New threats to national security require new types of systems to be developed. Because
those new systems are yet to be fully defined, a defense company must be responsive to
those needs and be able to adjust their product development efforts. "A firm's ability to
sustain its success is most likely a result of constant innovation to adapt to changing
circumstances."8 8
86 Boeing F1 5K Fact Sheet (accessed February 2003); available on http://xvww.boeing.com/defense-
space/military/fl 5/f-I 5k/fl kfacts.htm.
87 Murman, et al., pg 1-2.
88 Porter, pg 65
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2.1.3. Suppliers
Suppliers within the defense industry are defined, for the purpose of this research, as all
those companies that supply components or relatively smaller systems to the primary
contractors described above. Because of the complexity of most defense systems,
hundreds to thousands of different subsystems and components are needed to deliver the
final product. Consequently, many primary contractors carry a myriad of suppliers;
Raytheon Missile Systems is currently working with a supply base of 10,000 companies.
The structure of the defense industry presents a number of challenges to the supply chain.
Typically low volumes within defense results in low profit margins for suppliers.
Technologies or components are often specific to defense and provide little opportunity
for suppliers to benefit from economies of scale. However, suppliers often provide the
same component to a number of different industries. Technology progresses at a faster
clockspeed in most other industries compared to defense. It is likely that a component
may become obsolete in the general market but is still needed within defense. Circuit
card technology, for example, progresses very rapidly in the consumer electronics
industry. Because production volumes and consequently profit margins are higher for
suppliers who cater to commercial electronics, they are likely to phase out the
components needed by defense companies that require the older technology. Making the
matter of technology obsolescence more complicated is that customers prefer and often
require products to use proven technology. Upgrading systems also requires that
companies validate performance.
The low production volumes dictate a minimal production capacity requirement within
the supply chain; leaving room for a limited number of suppliers. This reduces the ability
for primary contractors to force price wars among different suppliers. One of the larger
problems within the supply chain is that suppliers become sole source suppliers for
certain components. Also, primary contractors become highly dependent on them since
they can starve production further downstream. Even more hazardous to defense
companies is that parts become obsolete as suppliers phase parts out of their product lines
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if their profitability declines, as new technology advances or as suppliers advance their
technology to keep up with customers outside of the defense industry.
One of the more complicated aspects of managing the defense industry's supply chain is
that primary contractors compete against each other for one program often supply
subsystems to these same competitors on other programs. For example, Lockheed Martin
supplies Raytheon with the canister and launcher for the Patriot missile and performs
final assembly and test of the missile, canister, and launcher.89 Conversely, Raytheon is
developing three radar systems for Lockheed for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense
program. 90 In addition, competing companies are sometimes forced to create a single
development team. Development of the F/A-22 is a partnership between Boeing and
Lockheed Martin. 91
2.1.4. Threat of New Entrants
Given the size of the primary defense companies, there are extremely high barriers to
enter the defense industry at the major system level. A vast amount of resources are
required to be able to compete for large programs. Because the acquisition decision-
making process takes a company's reputation and credibility into account, a new entrant
has neither to compete with the established defense companies. However, a company
could potentially fulfill a niche market by supply high tech components with potentially
less competition and higher margins.
There are multiple different market segments within the defense industry that not all of
the major competitors are currently in. An existing defense company can more readily
attempt to enter a market segment new to their portfolio. In addition, defense
consolidation and acquisition allows companies easier access to different market
89 Lockheed Martin Patriot Product Fact Sheet (accessed November 2002); available on
http://www.Iockheedmartin.comi/factsheets/productI87.html.
90 Hoover's on-line - Raytheon Company profile (accessed December 2002); available on
www.hoovers.com.
91 Boeing F22 Fact Sheet (accessed February 2002); available on http://www.boeing.com/defenise-
space/military/f22/f22 back.html.
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segments. Due to the changing customer needs, it is possible that new defense markets
open where there are no entrenched players. For example, one of the newer threats to
national security is biological warfare. There are currently a multitude of companies,
from start-ups to existing defense companies, racing to develop products that can detect
and counter biological threats. It will be several years before any company can establish
a reputation for developing these types of systems and can grow to dominate the new
market segment.
2.1.5. Substitutes
Although missiles are a relatively mature industry, changes in customer needs means that
current weapons could be phased out and substituted by new products. Defense
companies need to respond by fulfilling current needs through new products. "The
United States faces a new imperative: It must both win the present war against terrorism
and prepare now for future wars - wars notably different from those of the past century
and even from the current conflict." 92 The events of September 1 t highlight the vast
changes in the type of threats that the US must be prepared to defend against.
"Contending with uncertainty must be a central tenet in U.S. defense planning."9 3
If the nature of wars and conflicts that are being fought are changing, for example, to
biological/chemical warfare, existing defense companies have limited experience to adapt
to this radical shift in technology. A shift in customer needs could also be driven by
increased use of non-lethal methods to win. Substitutes open the field of competition
since no dominant companies have emerged thus far. Currently, there are a myriad of
companies, both within the existing defense industry and outside it, that are looking to
address the changing military needs.
92 Donald Rumsfield, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2002, 1.
93 Rumsfield, pg 10
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2.1.6. Summary of Porter's Dynamics
Customers exert a high degree of control throughout the industry and are driving drastic
changes not only in the needs but also in the process by which companies fulfill those
needs. The massive consolidation of defense companies has created massive defense
entities that increase the barriers for others to enter. The defense industry has a
fragmented supply chain although suppliers have the potential to control development
and production efforts if they supply critical components and specific technology.
2.2. Clockspeed
The term "clockspeed" was coined by Charles Fine and is defined as the rate of evolution
of an industry. 94 Fine believes that "each industry evolves at a different rate, depending
in some way on its product clockspeed, process clockspeed, and organization
clockspeed." 95 His studies discuss how an industry's clockspeed is the rate of changes
that the entire industry undergoes and the responsiveness required from different
companies to adapt to changes in their industry. "Observers often note that some
industries - telecommunications, computers, and the like - undergo changes with
astonishing rapidity, whereas others seem to mosey along at a leisurely pace, scarcely
bothered by changes elsewhere in the business environment." 96
Industries that face fast clockspeeds are constantly redefining their business model and
are often exposed to turbulence in organizational dynamics. Companies within the
information-entertainment industry face one of the fastest clockspeeds as new processes
and services are rolled out every few months. At a relatively slower clockspeed, the
semiconductor industry measures changes in years rather than months and products have
a market life of two to four years before becoming obsolete. According to Fine, "at the
slowest end of the clockspeed scale.. .are the manufacturers of aircraft [who measure] a
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product's clockspeed in decades. Consequently, Raytheon and the rest of the defense
industry are in a relatively slow clockspeed when looking at the overall system. New
products, depending on the complexity of the system, can take years to develop from
concept to production and their market life can span decades. Subsystems of defense
products, such as electronics and processors, can have significantly greater clockspeeds,
adding additional complexity to the design.
Fine believes there are two primary drivers of clockspeed: technological innovation and
competitive intensity. "When an industry is subjected to an important innovation, that
industry typically feels a significant uptick in the overall clockspeed. The jet engine with
its effect on the transportation industry provides one example." 98 In his research, Fine
lists reasons for changing clockspeeds in industry - shocks to the business environment,
economic shocks, technological shocks, shocks from competitor's breakthrough products
and services, and shock of a new and newly dominant business model. 99 Changes in
technological innovation or competitive intensity have historically had a local effect
where "such effects would not usually strike an industry all at once." 00
Underlying this concept is that fast clockspeed industries are readily exposed to changes
and must be able to respond quickly to those changes to remain competitive. Companies
within slower clockspeed industries are insulated from immediate changes and have a
longer time period to adjust and respond to those changes. Consequently, the decision-
making process occurs at a relatively lower rate within industries that have slower
clockspeeds. Theoretically, Fine believes that the challenges that are facing industries
with faster clockspeeds will eventually affect all other industries and force them to
respond and change accordingly.
For example, the evolution of US auto manufacturers was spurred largely by the dramatic
increase in global competition. Initiatives to improve the manufacturing environment and
97 Fine, pg 7
98 Fine, pg 26
99 Fine, pg 30-31
100 Fine, pg 28
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apply programs, such as lean and agile, have become staples within that industry. At a
slower clockspeed, Boeing has recently been faced with global competition and the need
to drastically improve their operation to remain competitive. Consequently they have
chosen to adopt lean principles and create a moving assembly line for the final assembly
of the 777 commercial aircraft.
"The faster an industry evolves - that is, the faster its clockspeed - the more temporary a
company's advantage. The key is to choose the right advantage - again and again."1 0'
Companies must exploit their current capabilities and competitive advantages while at the
same time building new capabilities to prepare for the obsolescence of the old ones. The
prevailing efforts are to create a sustainable competitive advantage and effectively block
the competition out. For a relatively slow clockspeed industry, such as defense, a
competitive advantage can seem to be sustainable as changes occur more slowly.
However, the aggressive push of technology should be an indication that change will
come increasing in the clockspeed and decreasing in the amount of time that a capability
will remain a point of competitive advantage.
2.3. Chapter Summary
This chapter analyzes the dynamics of the defense industry using Porter's Five Forces
and discusses a number of changes occurring within the industry. The concept of
industry clockspeed is introduced and defined as the rate at which change occurs in an
industry. In addition, this chapter details the general business environment defense
companies face that provides a context for the remainder of this research. More
specifically, background information about the competitive environment as well as the
challenges and constraints Raytheon faces is provided. Finally, this chapter includes an
impetus for defense companies, particularly the shift to Better, Faster, Cheaper, to
recognize the industry changes that are driving change in how companies do business.
New requirements and demands are being placed on competitors and those companies
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that can continually develop better products within a faster timeframe and at a cheaper
cost will have a competitive advantage.
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Chapter 3 Raytheon Company
The basis of this thesis is a research project at Raytheon Missile Systems (RMS); it is
necessary to understand the environment within the company. To better understand the
culture and organization, this chapter describes the corporation, its history and the general
business practices of Raytheon Company. In addition, this chapter describes the business
markets in which RMS competes.
3.1. Background Information
Raytheon is a leading edge technology company that provides electronic systems in both
the commercial and defense sectors. Raytheon produces and develops a range of
products from radar to business jets. Founded in 1922, achievements in the company's
history include the solution for mass-producing magnetrons for radar in World War II,
the invention of microwave cooking, the development of the first guided missile able to
hit a flying target and the computer that guided the Apollo astronauts in their historic
journey to the moon.10 2
Raytheon is divided into a matrix organization by function & product technology. Figure
4 describes their corporate organizational structure.
102 Boston History Collaborative on awarding Raytheon Company with 2002 History Makers Award
(accessed November 2002); available on littp://www.raytheon.com/feature/hma/index.html.
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Figure 4 Raytheon's Corporate Organizational Structure03
Within the Government & Defense sector, there are seven different business units that
directly address different customer needs. With corporate sales of $16.8 billion for
2002,.. the U.S. government accounts for 73% of sales, including international defense
sales. The U.S. Department of Defense constituted 62% of sales for Raytheon in 2002.105
'03 Raytheon Company (accessed November 2002); available on http://www.raytheon .com/busin1esses/.
104 Raytheon Company 2002 Annual Report, (accessed March 2003); available on
http://wvw.raytheon .com/finance/annrpt.htm-ni, pg 2.
10s Raytheon Company 2002 Annual Report, (accessed March 2003); available on
http://www.raytheon.com/finance/annrpt.html, pg 2.
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"Raytheon's commercial electronics businesses leverage defense technologies in
commercial markets. Raytheon Aircraft is a provider of business and special mission
aircraft and delivers a broad line of jet, turboprop and piston-powered airplanes."10 6
Raytheon, as well as other major defense companies, have been successful thus far by
providing cutting edge technology to the customer. The customer historically demanded
defense products and systems that push the limits of technology. The companies that
succeeded required bright engineering talent that could innovate products that went
higher, farther, and faster than ever before. Within an organization, this technology push
resulted in the creation of ivory towers for product technology research and development
groups and consequently the marginalization of all other functions such as
manufacturing.
Product development leaders at Raytheon are typically grown from the engineering and
research communities. With a career foundation within the ivory towers, the status quo
incentive in development is to go higher, farther and faster than ever before. Given
additional funds, investments are more likely to be made to push the technology "one iota
further" instead of to address other functional needs, i.e. evaluating the design for
manufacturability or identifying and developing new manufacturing capabilities.
Given that a majority of defense sales involve the same customer, it is important to
understand the customer's business strategy and be able to develop a strong working
relationship. The primary customers, the government and armed forces, drove the
defense companies to mimic their culture of command-and-control, hierarchical structure.
3.2. One Company Tools
As mentioned earlier, Raytheon recently acquired a number of different sectors in the late
1990's: Hughes, Texas Instruments and E-Systems. The rapid growth at Raytheon was
106 Wall Street Journal profile of Raytheon Company (accessed November 2002); available on
www.wsi.com.
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followed by a number of reorganizations as overlapping work was consolidated and
different areas were reorganized, restructured and relocated to better align the entire
enterprise. For example, Centers of Excellence were formed to combine the production
of their commodity type products to reduce overhead costs, increase production volumes
and thus achieving economies of scale. However, given the difficulties of merging
different companies and cultures after an acquisition there are many areas that are still
working as distinct entities. Raytheon is still striving to work as one company. To that
end, a number of tools were developed using both internal and external best practices to
standardize basic processes across the company. This section describes two tools
pertinent to this research: the Integrated Product Development System, and Raytheon Six
Sigma.
3.2.1. Integrated Product Development System (IPDS)
IPDS is a template for managers and employees of Raytheon to follow throughout a
product's development cycle. IPDS is available on Raytheon's intranet where it is
accessible to all employees with a computer terminal. This system mirrors the DAU's
acquisition model shown in Figure 3. Refer to Table 4 to view the IPDS phases and
gates.
Phase 1: Business Strategy Execution
Gate 1: Interest/no interest
Gate 2: Pursue/no pursue
Gate 3: Bid/no bid
Gate 4: Bid/proposal review
Phase 2: Project Planning, Management and Control
Gate 5: Start up review
Phase 3: Requirements and Architecture Development
Gate 6: Internal system functional review
Phase 4: Product Design and Development
Gate 7: Internal preliminary design review
Gate 8: Internal critical design review
Phase 5: System Integration, Test, Verification and Validation
Gate 9: Internal test/ship readiness review
Phase 6: Production and Deployment
Gate 10: Internal production readiness review
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Phase 7: Project Control
Gate 11: Transition and shut down
Table 4: Integrated Product Development System Overview107
Each gate is further developed to include major tasks that should be completed by all of
the different stakeholders, from program managers to facilities personnel. Each program
is encouraged to use IPDS although they are allowed to tailor the standard process to suit
their specific development needs. Different programs use different systems of to plan
their product development efforts and may not use IPDS at all.
Recall from the government's acquisition model that a contract can span different phases
of development. Contracts can span different portions of the IPDS from development
contracts such as trade studies to the delivery of additional products with no further
development. Phase 1 occurs each time the customer chooses to begin the acquisition
process, i.e. Milestones A, B, or C. If the contract is awarded to Raytheon, Phase 2, 3,
and 4 of IPDS begin. Phase 5 and 6 coincides with the customer Production and
Deployment phase of acquisition as well as sustainment. Phase 7 encompasses the latter
portion of sustainment and determines Raytheon's plan of action for facilitating the
destruction of obsolete systems.
While IPDS details the steps that should be taken for effective product development
planning, the culture of Raytheon rewards individuals who can effectively save a
program in crisis. The underlying incentive is that heroes can only be formed if programs
are in crisis. Effective program planning is not necessarily valued since this would
generally prevent programs from running into major obstacles. This may be one of the
reasons why the culture does not reinforce the use of planning tools such as IPDS.
107 Raytheon Company Intranet - Integrated Product Development System (accessed October 2002); not
publicly available.
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3.2.2. Raytheon Six Sigma
Raytheon Six Sigma is a continuous process improvement program that empowers
employees at all levels to improve how they work. The program is based on W. Edwards
Deming's improvement cycle of "Plan, Do, Check, Act." Raytheon's Six Sigma model is
illustrated in Figure 5.
R60r
Mp Rytheo Six Sigma
Figure 5 Raytheon Six Sigma Model 08
The six different phases of the program are Visualize, Commit, Prioritize, Characterize,
Improve, and Achieve. Visualize involves picturing the ideal state of affairs and creating
a vision for changing an area. Commit refers to obtaining upfront commitment from
leaders and stakeholders involved in the change process. Prioritize requires that the goals
of the project be defined and prioritized. This phase of Six Sigma plans high-level action
and serves as a check and balance stage for aligning leaders with the project.
Characterize characterizes the source of the problem, identifies a solution and metrics for
change. Improve involves the design and implementation of the solution as well as
control systems to verify the impact and success. Achieve is the final step of the process
where the success of the Six Sigma project is celebrated. The entire process is intended
to be iterative to allow project members to review and reevaluate any step of the process
until the ideal state is reached. 109
1 Raytheon Company Intranet - Six Sigma (accessed October 2002); not publicly available.
'
09 Raytheon Company Internal Benchmarking Handbook, ed. September 2002, pg 2.
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Employees are trained in the different phases of Six Sigma as well as in basic tools
required in the process such as statistics and affinity diagrams. Once their training is
completed, employees are tasked to apply Six Sigma to their every day tasks as either
individuals or groups. Once a project is completed, the project efforts are documented
and made available on the company's intranet for the entire enterprise to access.
Employees are then certified as Six Sigma Specialists and encouraged to continually
apply Six Sigma. As of 2002, Six Sigma projects have "achieved a cumulative gross
benefit of some $1.8 billion in its first four years."" 0
This internship research project fell under the auspices of Six Sigma. The involvement of
Six Sigma was beneficial to the implementation effort at RMS because it gave the author
access to a number of individuals who are familiar with the culture of the organization
and can provide an enterprise level view of the entire company. In addition, by
documenting this effort as a Six Sigma project, the research findings can be easily
disseminated and transferred throughout the company.
3.3. Raytheon Missile Systems
Raytheon Missile Systems (RMS) is one of the business units within Raytheon Company
designing, developing and producing missile systems for critical requirements, including
Air-to-Air, Strike, Surface Navy Air Defense, Land Combat, Guided Projectiles, Exo-
atmospheric Kill Vehicles, and Directed Energy Weapons. The product portfolio for
RMS includes the Tomahawk, Maverick, AMRAAM, and Standard missiles to name a
few. RMS is located in Tucson, Arizona with net sales in 2002 of $3 billion."' The
manufacturing facility predominantly assembles and integrates systems as a large
percentage of components are outsourced.
"0 Raytheon Company 2002 Annual Review, (accessed March 2003); available on
http://wvw.ravtheon.com/finance/annrpt.htm-ni, pg 2.
1" Raytheon Company 2002 Annual Report, (accessed March 2003); available on
http://www.raytheon.com/finance/annrpt.html, pg 6.
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3.3.1. Historical Context
Originally, this facility belonged to Hughes Aircraft Company, founded by Howard
Hughes in 1936.112 The company was originally founded as a non-profit technology
research organization and was often referred to as Howard Hughes' personal labs,
providing him with research grants and space to tinker and play with new technologies.
As with most start-ups, "the personal beliefs, assumptions, and values of the entrepreneur
or founder are imposed on the people he or she hires, and - if the organization is
successful - they come to be shared, seen as correct, and eventually taken for granted." 1 3
As a non-profit, the emphasis was to continually research new technologies instead of
delivering hardware. The price on the products that were developed and produced was
extremely high since minimal consideration was given to reduce costs. An aura of
eliticism surrounded the products leading to the prevailing belief that pushing the
envelope on technology is the most important aspect of product development.
General Motors (GM) acquired Hughes Aircraft in 1985 and lost its non-profit status. In
1992, General Dynamics sold its Missile Systems to Hughes Aircraft. Under General
Motors' leadership, Hughes Aircraft became an entity within a newly formed Hughes
Electronics."4 Additional changes occurred with the influence of General Motors,
primarily the formation of Knowledge Centers, similar to the one created in GM's
corporate headquarters as repositories of knowledge. As part of reorganization,
numerous General Dynamic's facilities were relocated to Tucson. The final acquisition
of Hughes Electronics by Raytheon led to further reorganization. Tucson, in particular,
houses legacy programs from Hughes, Texas Instruments and E-Systems; employees
from each bringing their own processes and culture.
112 Hughes Aircraft History (accessed on February 2003); available on
http://www.shanaberger.com/hughes.htim.
113 Schein, pg 91.
114 US Centennial of Flight Commission - The Hughes Companies (accessed on February 2003); available
on http://www.1903to2003.eov/essav/Aerosace/Huhes/Aero44.htm.
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Research on the formation of organizational cultures has found that "the culture that the
organization acquired during its early years is now taken for granted.""' Within
Raytheon, it is the legacy Hughes business units that are more emphatic in their quest to
push the capabilities of product technology. The consolidation of Raytheon has been
slow, as leaders have grappled with honoring the heritage and successes of the legacy
companies and forming one entity. To this day, people identify themselves and
differentiate each other with the company or facility from which they were originally
hired.
3.3.2. Organizational Structure
Like the parent organization, RMS is structured in matrix form divided by function and
product and research families. Figure 6 displays the organizations relevant to this
project.
Raytheon Missile
Systems
Operations
P____Lt___ _
Productivity I[nineering F-
-i
Manufacturing Knowledge
Engineering Center
Center
Affordable~ L Raytheon
Multi-Missile Six Sigma
Manufacturing
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Figure 6 RMS Organizational Structure
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The primary functional organizations affected by the outcome of this research are
Operations, Engineering, and Productivity. The Operations organization is responsible
for all production issues such as manufacturing and supply chain management as well as
the management and maintenance of facilities. The Manufacturing Engineering Center
(MEC) is a supporting organization providing development and production programs
with project engineers, assembly engineers and manufacturing engineers to develop
manufacturing processes and generate step-by-step instructions for line workers. The
MEC has traditionally focused on project engineering from a manufacturing viewpoint
and on resolving manufacturability issues that arise while in production. Their
improvement skills can be characterized as focusing on design for manufacturing and
assembly (DFMA) and in incremental improvements to existing manufacturing
processes.
The Affordable Multi-Missile Manufacturing organization (AM ) is the result of a
customer effort to facilitate and encourage flexible manufacturing practices such as
design reuse and component commonality across different missile programs. This
organization was established to match the efforts of the Defense Advanced Research
Program Agency (DARPA)' 1, the government's primary research agency, as well as
other government agencies that are needed to provide additional funding support to help
reduce manufacturing costs.
The factories are considered the end users of any new capabilities developed within the
AMDC. Factories within RMS fall into two distinct categories: those dedicated to
specific product lines and those that are shared throughout the business unit. The latter
set of factories provides similar components or subsystems to the product lines. Common
factories include the Ultra Precision Machining, Composites and the Electro-Optical
Sensors and Precision Assembly. While the initial focus of the AMDC is to impact
internal development, once the center is proficient at developing new capabilities, the
emphasis can shift to impact supplier capabilities. Productivity is responsible for all
116 Department of Defense - Defense Advanced Research Program Agency, DARPA, (accessed July 2002);
available on www.darpa.mil.
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efforts that increase the productivity of RMS. The Knowledge Center and Raytheon Six
Sigma are both within the Productivity organization. The Knowledge Center is primarily
viewed as a repository of information and provides training and workshops on existing
tools such as design for manufacturing. In addition, the Knowledge Center has some
prototyping capabilities, particularly with the use of stereo-lithography equipment.
Raytheon Six Sigma has thus far focused on improving the manufacturing environment
and hopes to use manufacturing innovation as a leverage to break into the engineering
and research environment.
Engineering provides the engineering staff needed for all development programs from
many different disciplines. Product lines include all missile systems currently in
production. All research and development efforts are housed within Advanced Programs.
These are typically early phase contracts that are several years away from production.
Once a program completes development it is transitioned from Advanced Programs to
Product Lines. Advanced Programs also consist of pure product technology research
conducted by RMS Technologists. These technologists form a link throughout the
corporation to ensure they are connected to pure research centers that focus exclusively
on pushing the existing bounds of technologies.
3.3.3. Product Maturity Analysis
RMS has a broad number of missile programs that meet a variety of customer critical
requirements. A large number of missile programs have been in production for several
decades as product families have proliferated. New designs continually evolve the family
architecture by updating the technology. Other missile programs are entering the early
phases of development. These programs are working to implement the latest technology
into a new missile system to meet new customer needs. While technologies are
continually evolving, the basic architecture of missiles has stabilized and the major
subsystems are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7 Missile Architecture"7
The technologies used within those subsystems are continually evolving to match the
customer's requirements as new technologies are developed. The existence of a standard
missile architecture mirrors the dominant design theory espoused by Abernathy and
Utterback. Maturity of RMS products can be characterized using this model and is
depicted in Figure 8 below.
Advanced Programs
Product Lines
Process
Innovation
Product
Innovation
Product Maturity
Figure 8 Product Maturity of Missile Systems
Existing product lines at RMS are in the transitional phase of development. These
products have been in existence for a number of years and undergo incremental design
improvements. Continuous manufacturing improvement projects, led primarily through
11 Robert A. Nicol 'Design and Analysis of an Enterprise Metrics System,' MSM & MSCE, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2001, pg 14.
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Six Sigma projects at Raytheon, are largely focused on improving production on the
existing product lines. Development within Advanced Programs focuses largely on
designing new systems or products using radical new technologies. The rate of product
innovation within Advanced Programs is extremely high - characteristic of products
within the fluid phase of development. Typically, the rate of process innovation within
Advanced Programs is limited.
In addition, RMS products can be characterized using the framework that Pisano
developed on product types depending on the required rate of product and process
innovation, shown in Table 2. According to this framework, defense systems within
RMS have a relatively high rate of product innovation. Product Lines can be
characterized as Product Driven using Pisano's terminology as they are primarily
assembled products that primarily use established manufacturing processes. Process
innovation required by the Product Lines is relatively low. Process improvements focus
on incremental improvements or modifying the design to better adapt to established
manufacturing processes, i.e. design for manufacturability.
Advanced Programs consist of a blend of assembled subsystems but include advanced
materials and high precision electronic subsystems as well. Pisano would characterize
products within Advanced Programs as Process Enabling. A high degree of process
innovation is required for these products since there are no existing manufacturing
processes available to build the product. Pisano's framework validates the assumption
that the AMDC should focus primarily on Advanced Programs as the primary customer
since there is a high degree of alignment between the manufacturing innovation needs of
Advanced Programs and the services the AMDC will provide.
Advanced Programs are in the early phases of development allowing the AMDC time to
develop new manufacturing technologies and to influence the design. Product Lines
should be considered second tier customers, at least initially, since they may be able to
use AMDC solutions to improve their existing products. The additional challenge in
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targeting Product Lines is the difficulty in modifying the existing design to make better
use of new manufacturing technology.
3.4. Chapter Summary
This chapter describes the corporate environment and organizational structure of
Raytheon Company with a particular emphasis on correlations between the parent
company and the business unit. The RMS organizational structure was also presented as
well as an analysis of the maturity of product within their portfolio. The culture at RMS
brought about by its historical evolution is somewhat fragmented due to the many
acquisitions but is dominated throughout by product development.
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Chapter 4 Advanced Manufacturing Development Center
With increased competition and pressure from the "Better, Faster, Cheaper" environment
surrounding aerospace and defense companies, product development is a key competitive
factor. Product development encompasses the design and production of new systems
from identifying customer needs to deliver the system. However, "since firms buy most
new technologies for manufacturing operations, it is difficult for them to use these
technologies to achieve competitive advantage because it is difficult to protect them from
imitation and circumvention."' 18 While traditionally the ability to innovate and design
new products is at the core of their competitive advantage, a company's ability to also
manufacture products is becoming a competitive advantage. In this new environment,
companies not only have to continually innovate new products at a faster rate but also be
able to produce them faster and cheaper than the competition. Soon, companies will be
reaching the limits of their own development capabilities to meet the customer's needs.
The Director of Operations has identified this need and determined one solution for RMS
is to establish an Advanced Manufacturing Development Center (AMDC). The AMDC
will be responsible for developing new manufacturing technologies by providing low-
cost solutions to the next generation engineering designs with a practical application
within RMS factories.
The main premise of this project is to use academic research to provide a new perspective
to facilitate the implementation of the AMDC. In implementing change, a number of
issues must be considered, such as how to introduce change into an organization,
understanding the potential responses of the stakeholders using different perspectives or
lenses, as well as understanding the dynamics of the culture and identifying the cultural
driving forces of an organization.
118 John E. Ettlie and Ernesto M. Reza, "Organizational Integration and Process Innovation," The Academy
of Management Journal 35, no. 4 (Oct 1992), pg 795.
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4.1. AMDC Description
The Advanced Manufacturing Development Center is the functional homeroom within
RMS of new manufacturing processes, technologies and skills. The AMDC will create,
validate, and assist in the deployment of new processes and technologies associated with
new product design, development and production. The new center will also support the
pursuit of additional funds for use on innovation technology development from external
entities such as DARPA, the Department of Defense Manufacturing Technology Program
(ManTech),' 19 and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 20
Along with the AM 3 (Affordable Multi-Missile Manufacturing organization), the AMDC
will facilitate customer involvement, both internal and external to Raytheon in the
development of new manufacturing technology and processes. Similarly, the center will
support collaborative relationships with internal and external customers. The AMDC will
validate advanced processes via assembly and test of representative hardware and ensure
the use and reuse of processes, technologies and tooling across the enterprise.
4.2. AMDC Implementation
A small team was commissioned to create the new center and introduce change to RMS.
As change agents, the team had to be aware that "implementing a major and lasting
change requires skills akin to a juggler's.. .striking a delicate balance between individual
and collective actions, paying attention to the content as well as the process of change,
and pursuing both short-term and long-term goals."12 ' Primarily, the short-term goals of
the center were to establish itself within the existing organizational framework to add
value to the enterprise. The long-term goals focus on the operational infrastructure of the
new center and on efficient process development and innovation. Academic research, as
previously discussed, has studied organizations that have attempted to introduce change
19 Department of Defense Manufacturing Technology Program, ManTech, (accessed November 2002);
available on www.dodmantech.com.
120 National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, (accessed January 2003); available on
www.nist.gov.
121 Ancona, et al, module 8, core pg. 11
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both successfully and unsuccessfully. These research efforts provide an additional
perspective for the implementation team to effectively introduce change. For example,
identifying and involving the stakeholders early in the decision process will facilitate
their acceptance and generate support for the AMDC. By influencing the efforts and
policies of the new organization, stakeholders will have a stake in the change process and
be more compelled to help it succeed.
In the context of this effort, the customer is a critical stakeholder. The underlying
purpose of the AMDC is to add value to the customer thereby giving RMS a competitive
advantage. Building a relationship between AMDC and the customer is critical not only
to increase their awareness of RMS' capabilities but also to help fund manufacturing
innovation efforts that will, in the long term, improve their products. Subsequent changes
will explore how to introduce change into an organization, particularly given the cultural
environment.
The AMDC should also focus on creating a strong alliance with Advanced Programs, the
primary customer.
"Recent work on innovation and technology implementation suggests the
importance of closeness between collaborating parties for the successful
development and adoption of new technologies. 'Closeness' is used here
both in the literal sense, as allowing more frequent, effective, often
unplanned interaction, and more broadly, to encompass common
language, modes of communication, customs, conventions, and social
norms. Such relationships are said to be particularly important in the case
of production process innovations."12 2
Physically collocating the two major entities involved in manufacturing innovation will
help form a stronger alliance between the two. Research indicates "the frequency of
communication is strongly related to project success."123 In addition, the ease with which
122Meric S. Gertler, "'Being There': Proximity Organization, and Culture in the Development and
Adoption of Advanced Manufacturing Technologies," Economic Geography, volume 71, Issue 1,
Collaboration and Competition in Geographical Context (Jan., 1995) 1-26.
123 Yar M. Ebadi, and James M. Utterback, "Effects of Communication on Technological Innovation,"
Management Science 30, no. 5 (May, 1984), pg 579.
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the two entities can communicate with each other will improve coordination and
collaboration on all joint product development efforts.
More daunting to the task of introducing change is that scholars believe the change
process requires some form of survival anxiety or a burning platform to catalyze
action. 1 Raytheon has adopted this belief requiring each Six Sigma project to determine
the burning platform to implement change. Not only is RMS a leader in the missile
defense market but also there are also minimal indications that their current practices are
inadequate. RMS product development efforts currently meet customer needs, sell their
products and systems, prove new technologies, and win new contracts among other
things.
The president of RMS, Louise Francesconi, believes the biggest challenge for RMS is to
avoid becoming complacent in the face of success. "The more successful an organization
is the more difficult it is to trigger peoples' action." RMS leaders recognize that there
is currently no burning platform and it is easy to stagnate and become overly confidant in
their position. The lack of a burning platform does not necessarily prevent change from
occurring but introducing and implementing change will be a more challenging endeavor
because of it. Effectively implementing change will require time and dedication to
follow through with the implementation of the center and in essence with a new ideology
to develop products.
One of the methods for trying to overcome this initial challenge is through a strong
leader. Schein believes a charismatic leader can "get employees' attention to avoid a
complacent reaction that the bosses are only crying wolf." The leader can trigger
survival anxiety or guilt and make employees believe the organization is in trouble and
needs to change.12 6 The dedication and charisma of the Director of Operations can go far
in overcoming the lack of urgency. His reputation as a proactive leader, along with an
124 Schein, pg 117
125 Andrew H. Van de Ven, "Central Problems in the Management of Innovation," Management Science
32, no. 5 (1986), pg 591.
126 Schein, pg 120
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engineering background, gives him the credibility with both the engineering and
operations communities. Both the Director of Operations and the Director of
Engineering are working together to improve the product development process at RMS.
In addition, they are attempting to resolve some of the organizational differences that
prevent collaboration between their respective communities. This solidarity and
collaboration from the leadership is a clear signal to all employees that RMS leadership is
committed to change.
4.3. Business Lenses
There are a wide number of issues to consider in establishing a new center within an
existing organization. The theory of Organizational Processes suggests characterizing the
organization and the changes that a new center will create through three different lenses:
strategic, political and cultural. The strategic lens addresses issues of how the center fits
within the greater context of the organization and how the center will meet its
requirements and goals. The political lens focuses on the bureaucracy involved in an
established organization and attempts to identify supporters as well as adversaries to be
aware of to ensure the success of the center. The final lens, cultural, develops an
understanding of the norms of the organization: the manner in which people relate to each
other.
4.3.1. Strategic Lens
In introducing change into an organization, it is important to consider the strategic
implications of the change. There are two main issues in the implementation of the
center that must be given particular strategic consideration: the organizational fit and
meeting the challenge of manufacturing innovation.
Organizational fit corresponds to how well the AMDC can be integrated into the existing
enterprise. To do so, it is necessary to obtain buy-in from multiple levels of the
organization. In a hierarchical organization such as Raytheon, the acceptance of senior
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leadership is crucial to generate support for the AMDC. The start-up costs associated
with the implementation and development of the new center are significant. The initial
investment of resources, in terms of laboratory facilities, staffing as well as initial
funding, must not only be justified but must also be supported by the leadership team. In
addition, the potential impact of the AMDC encompasses many levels of the enterprise,
from the engineering communities that design new systems to the factories that will use
the new manufacturing technology in production, and eventually to the suppliers' efforts
to develop and produce subsystems. For the center to be able to influence other
organizations, they need the support of the different leaders.
To be successful, the AMDC requires the support of customers, both internal and
external, that will benefit from the center's innovations. Like other internal organizations
that provide a service or add value to product development, the AMDC is considered a
cost center. As such, internal organizations must fund development work at the AMDC if
they choose to benefit from the center's capabilities. Therefore, the AMDC must not
only validate the importance of their capabilities and the service they provide but they
must also convince customers to pay for their services. Under existing development
contracts, programs are given a small amount of discretionary funds to invest in indirect
development, i.e. outside of contractual development obligations. However, there are
multiple internal organizations vying for the same pool of discretionary funds, including
the same programs that manage those funds that wish to invest in pushing technology
forward.
If the AMDC can generate support for its development efforts from external customers,
then additional investments can be generated to fund manufacturing innovation. There
are two distinct avenues to generate manufacturing research funds from external
customers. First, research grants may be obtained from external research agencies that
are funded by the government, i.e. DARPA, ManTech, NIST, etc. These agencies were
established to help fund innovation within the private sector. The underlying assumption
is that these agencies have no direct stake in any particular technology and can optimize
research investments from a more global perspective.
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Second, the initial proposal submitted to the customer can include a financial budget
dedicated to manufacturing innovation that will mitigate manufacturing risks during
development. For the AMDC to have input in the proposals submitted requires a high
level of collaboration before the start of internal research programs. Approval of the
manufacturing innovation budget requires that customer's value manufacturing
development. More importantly, the AMDC needs to build credibility and prove that
they can mitigate manufacturing risks by developing new manufacturing capabilities. In
addition, AMDC collaboration during development improves the system design, and
reduces production costs without impacting the overall development budget and schedule
constraints of the program.
To establish the AMDC, coordination and collaboration is required throughout the
enterprise to garner the benefits of manufacturing innovation. It would be useful to
create incentives to encourage other organizations to coordinate with the AMDC by
modifying their current efforts or to collaborate by actively participating in identifying
and addressing manufacturing risks. Development programs that are underway have a
limited source of funds to invest to direct towards manufacturing innovation, particularly
if the capabilities of the AMDC are unproven. To overcome these challenges, senior
leaders could implement incentives that encourage the acceptance of the need for the
AMDC.
One of the main requirements of the AMDC is that all development efforts focus on
practical applications of manufacturing innovation. This limits the center's ability from
initiating research projects for the sake of research, thereby wasting resources on
development projects that are not implemented. Development projects require that a
customer pull manufacturing technology development from the AMDC. The requirement
for practicality encourages customers to invest in the AMDC since it is clear to see they
will directly benefit from the development project. However, it is important to note that
acceptance of the AMDC by internal customers is largely dictated by the center's ability
to form networks.
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The AMDC is chartered to create a competitive advantage for RMS. To be successful,
the center must be capable of balancing a number of factors in selecting development
projects; short-term vs. long-term, low risk vs. high risk, and small return vs. large return.
For the sustainability of the center, it is important to strategically consider both the short-
term and long-term goals. In the short term, it is important for the AMDC to secure a
stream of funding and win the support of customers thereby identifying opportunities for
manufacturing innovation and obtaining a stream of funding. The short-term center
needs are to create specific manufacturing technologies to build credibility. The
acceptance of the AMDC by other entities is more likely to occur once the new center's
capabilities have been proven. By creating early 'wins' the AMDC will effectively signal
others of their credibility to develop practical manufacturing technologies.
In the long-term, the decision to invest in and develop new manufacturing technologies
should be strategically evaluated to create the largest impact for RMS. Recall, the long-
term emphasis of the AMDC is to create a competitive advantage for the company by not
only developing innovative and practical manufacturing technologies but also by
becoming proficient at manufacturing development. In essence, the long-term goal of the
center should be to make the existence and capabilities of the AMDC a competitive
advantage, providing RMS with the skills and reputation for identifying manufacturing
risks and developing new manufacturing technology during product development. The
need to build early wins for short-term benefits might result in a less than optimal
manufacturing research portfolio. It is likely that the AMDC will reach the limits of their
resources, particularly in terms of available staff, in the near future. With that constraint
in mind, the projects that are accepted in the short-term will dictate the center's direction
for a significant period of time.
Similarly, the center must be proactive in choosing development projects that balance
low risk projects with high risk projects. Risk in manufacturing development include
such factors as the probability that the manufacturing need will manifest itself in the final
product, the probability that the center will be able to find a practical innovative solution
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and that there is a feasible investment required. Development projects with a lower risk
are more attractive in the short-term since the likelihood of success is high and the return
on investment, while relatively low, is clearly visible. In addition, traditional return on
investment calculations favor short-term, low risk projects.
It is necessary to build the capabilities that provide adequate service to programs whose
projects carry higher risks. Higher risk projects inherently have a high degree of
uncertainty although these projects have the potential for generating much larger benefits.
These projects would presumably include a higher degree of complexity allowing the
AMDC to explore and expand their development capabilities. As mentioned earlier,
current internal incentives often lead employees to pursue lower risk projects who are
more likely to see an early return, albeit a small one. There are currently few incentives
to encourage and reward long-term planning throughout Raytheon. Aside from the
traditional financial numbers that are typically involved in investment decisions, the
pursuit of development projects should include strategic considerations to diversify risks
and benefits in the AMDC project portfolio.
4.3.2. Political Lens
The implementation of a new organization has clear implications that challenge the
existing political structure. After extensive internal discussions with multiple
stakeholders, it was decided that the AMDC would report directly to the Director of
Operations instead of under an existing organization within Operations.
"Radical and incremental innovations have such different competitive
consequences because they require different organizational capabilities.
Incremental innovation reinforces the capabilities of established
organizations, while radical innovation forces them to ask a new set of
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questions, to draw on new technical and commercial skills, and to employ
new problem-solving approaches."
The center's focus on developing radical manufacturing processes presents additional
challenges for existing organizations. Manufacturing innovation would require a skill set
from the employees and the leaders different from their current capabilities.
Of the multiple stakeholders described earlier, two in particular are challenged by the
existence of the AMDC: the Manufacturing Engineering Center and the Knowledge
Center. The Manufacturing Engineering Center (MEC) develops manufacturing
processes and generates step-by-step instructions for line workers. Original support for
the AMDC came from the MEC with the belief that combining the knowledge of existing
manufacturing capabilities and factory environments with the development of new
manufacturing capabilities would allow them to provide more thorough manufacturing
solutions for different programs. However, the MEC has traditionally focused on project
engineering from a manufacturing viewpoint and on resolving manufacturability issues
that arise while in production. Their manufacturing development skills can be
characterized as design for manufacturing and assembly and as incremental
improvements to existing processes.
The Knowledge Center is an internal repository for knowledge and tools that provide
training to product development groups to improve the design. In addition, they have
prototyping capabilities, primarily stereolithography equipment, within their labs. The
Knowledge Center is in the process of revitalizing their organization and control over the
AMDC would help them provide additional services to product development programs.
Both of these organizations had an interest in controlling the direction of the AMDC.
The decision to make the AMDC a distinct entity within operations generated some
resentment. A negative relationship between the three would generate mistrust and
127 Rebecca M. Henderson and Kim B. Clark, "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing
Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms." Administrative Science Quarterly 35, no. 1,
Special Issue/Technology, Organization, and Innovation (Mar., 1990), pg. 9.
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prevent collaboration, which is key in providing complete manufacturing support to
product development. A clear understanding among all three parties of the roles and
responsibilities of each is needed along with definitions of how the three centers can
work together to maximize the overall benefit to RMS. Overlapping interests between
the three should be clearly defined to prevent duplicate efforts, competition, and potential
undermining of the other's contributions. Significant effort should be made to prevent
any existing organization from becoming threatened by the AMDC.
Additionally, it is important to determine who will benefit from the goodwill generated
by the AMDC. Assigning credit for development work is critical in establishing internal
sustainability for the AMDC. In manufacturing innovation projects, it is primarily the
teams that are responsible for developing new manufacturing technology and should be
rewarded and recognized accordingly for their efforts. Recognizing team members will
lend credibility to employees who pursue careers that include manufacturing innovation.
The AMDC should receive some of credit to build its reputation and credibility. More
importantly, the customers, programs and their managers should be recognized for their
support of the center and their proactive approach to modifying product development
efforts. Widespread recognition will help publicize the benefits of process innovation.
In every development project, there is the likelihood that an effort will not be as
successful as initially expected. If a viable, low-cost solution is developed, the project
should be classified a win and credit dispersed throughout the organization. Conversely,
the inability to implement a new manufacturing process should not be a burden on the
team or stakeholders if exogenous factors outside of their control are the constraint. To
label a development effort as a failure will prevent others from becoming involved as
team members in the development work or in funding new projects all together.
4.3.3. Cultural Lens
In order for the AMDC to fulfill its mission and explore its full potential, it is necessary
to combine, to some degree, two distinct cultures: engineering and operations. Section
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4.4 describes a model to help understand how these two groups of people relate to each
other in the context of changing current product development efforts. Engineering and
operations often work in isolation from each other, locally optimizing their contribution
but not considering the others needs or constraints. This phenomenon is common in
many US manufacturing companies; traditional manufacturing development is based on
designs that were thrown over the wall from engineering. Ivory walls built to prevent
disturbances to engineering's product development efforts have reinforced the disparity
between the two. Reinforcement of the current culture has led to the establishment of a
hierarchy between the two where employees involved in product development are valued
as leading Raytheon's competitive efforts.
Each organization has a distinct status within RMS where engineering is at the core of
development and operations is a support function that more often than not constrains the
system. Each community has developed specific skills and behaviors that benefit the
efforts of their separate communities that further prevent them from being able to
collaborate and coordinate with each other. More specifically, the different communities
use different metrics with different incentives and are driven to pursue distinct goals.
The engineering organization focuses its efforts on product development where engineers
are measured on their ability to design the best performing product from a technical
standpoint. The operations organization is concerned with making the physical product
and meeting the delivery schedule. Employees within operations are measured on
quality, yield, and delivery status. In extreme cases, if engineers exceed their
development timeline and hand off the design to the operations group at a date later than
expected, operations employees are still expected to meet the delivery schedule.
Raytheon's culture is one that has emphasized the importance of engineering
development work and has attributed the company's success to this capability. Thus far,
RMS has succeeded in the market and continues to do so by following and encouraging
that belief. Coordination between the two requires that existing beliefs and perceptions
change. "Changing something implies not just learning something new but unlearning
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something that is already there and possibly in the way."128 For people to change within
RMS, they must unlearn how they perceive the boundaries of product development as
well as the current roles and contributions of engineering and operations.
Because it is easier to build on the existing strengths of the culture it is important to build
on the belief that innovation and striving to push technology is important. "The shared
beliefs, assumptions, and values then function in the organization as the basic glue that
holds it together, the major source of the organization's sense of identity, and the major
way of defining its distinctive competence.129 One of Raytheon's core capabilities is to
develop state of the art technologies and generate practical applications. Implementing
the AMDC does not require that the value and contributions of the engineering
community be eliminated, instead it is necessary to add another layer to product
development by considering manufacturing issues early in the process.
Within Advanced Programs, the engineering community is driven by their ability to
continually find military applications for new technologies. Their incentives and
accountability, as well as time and resource constraints, have thus far prevented any
substantial acceptance of the need to identify and mitigate manufacturing risks early in
development.
4.4. System Dynamic Causal Loop Diagrams
As mentioned in Section 1.3.3, System Dynamics is a management tool used to view and
understand complex systems. One application of System Dynamics, aside from those
topics previously discussed, is to understand the underlying forces that have led to the
current organization and see how those driving forces will react to change. System
Dynamics focuses on understanding the feedback processes within a system. "All
dynamics arise from the interaction of just two types of feedback loops, positive (or self-
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reinforcing) and negative (or self-correcting) loops."B3  Reinforcing loops reinforce the
behavior or change that is currently driving the system. Correcting or balancing loops
counteract change and force the system back to its original state of equilibrium. To make
full use of the capabilities of System Dynamics, a complete mathematical model of the
company could be developed, quantitatively identifying the relationships between
different parameters such as how different people relate to each other, the impact that
factors have on the system, etc. However, the results of the model would be ambiguous
at best since there is no data available to quantitatively define those relationships.
For this research, system dynamics is used to identify and understand the drivers of
behavior through a visual model known in the System Dynamics nomenclature as causal
loop diagrams. A causal loop diagram, while simplistic, will show how the different
factors relate to each other and leave the user to define the impact of the relationship on
the system. Causal loop diagrams are a visual way to display the reinforcing and
balancing feedback loops in a system to understand how different factors relate to each
other. Each factor identified in a system either positively or negatively affects the
subsequent factor, denoted by an arrow with a + or - symbol.
If the goal of this center is to create new manufacturing technologies to enable product
designs under development, there is an underlying need to modify the product
development process to develop the entire system. Three causal loop diagrams were
developed to reflect an organization's change response revolving around product
development - Customer Level, Managerial Level and Employee Level. The models are
not intended to reflect solely the environment within RMS but to include similar issues
faced by other manufacturing companies. The information used to develop these causal
loop diagrams was gathered through observing the environment at Raytheon Missile
Systems, by interviewing various employees and through frank discussions with other
manufacturing companies that face similar product development dilemmas.
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4.4.1. Customer Level
As described at length earlier, the customer impact in the defense industry is significant
in shaping the competitive environment and driving change down to different
organizations. The first causal loop diagram, shown in Figure 9, is a high-level general
description of the forces that drive a company's performance. A causal loop diagram
describing the customer's impact is detailed in Figure 9 below.
Revenue
Reputation/ Technology
Competence
Contract ++
Win/Retention Rate Product
Performance
Customer +Quailityisin
Satisfaction
Timeline
Perceived
Improvement U +
Meet Project
Requirements
New Initiative Capabilities Gap
Cost
Delay
Desired
+ Existing Capabilities +
Capabilities + + Changing Industry
Changing
Customer Needs Changing Political &
New Market Global Environment
opportunities
Figure 9 Customer Level Causal Loop Diagram
Causal loop diagrams can be understood by choosing a starting point in the model and
following the arrows to determine its impact on subsequent parameters. Conversely, the
arrows leading into a starting point can be traced to identify how parameters drive the
starting point.
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The central driver of this causal loop diagram is level of Customer Satisfaction achieved
by a company. The higher the level of Customer Satisfaction, the more likely a company
is to improve their Reputation/Competence as well as their Contract Win/Retention Rate.
A company's ability to retain and win contracts generates additional Revenue. Customer
Satisfaction is achieved by an increase in Product Performance while maintaining the
ability to Meet Project Requirements. A higher level of Product Performance is driven
by improvements in Technology and Quality, which are dictated by a company's Existing
Capabilities. To better Meet Project Requirements, a company should strive to decrease
their development Timeline and Cost, the drivers of that parameter. An increase in the
company's Existing Capabilities can reduce their development Timeline and Cost. In this
portion of the model, the parameter, Existing Capabilities, is shown in muted tone to
depict the parameter exists in another portion of the model that will be described shortly.
Conversely, this model also relates the negative impact of a customer and company
relationship. As Existing Capabilities decrease, Timeline and Cost increase which in turn
decrease a company's ability to Meet Project Requirements. Not meeting project
requirements leads to a decrease in Customer Satisfaction. Similarly, a decrease in
Existing Capabilities leads to a decrease in Technology and Quality. Consequently,
Product Performance also decreases leading to further loss of Customer Satisfaction. As
Customer Satisfaction decreases, a company begins to lose its Reputation/Competence,
decreases their Contract Win/Retention Rate and consequently decreases their Revenue.
Continuing with other aspects of the model Changing Customer Needs, New Market
Opportunities, Changing Political and Global Environment, and a Changing Industry
determine a company's Desired Capabilities. By comparing their Existing Capabilities
with their Desired Capabilities, a company can determine their Capabilities Gap. A
company that does not address their Capabilities Gap is likely to decrease the level of
Customer Satisfaction, which can eventually lead to a decrease in Revenue. A company
that is able to decrease their Capabilities Gap increases Customer Satisfaction. In
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addition, a company's Existing Capabilities increases resulting in an increase in Product
Performance, and its ability to Meet Project Requirements.
Using real world terminology, this causal loop diagram describes the effect that changing
customer needs is having on the industry. RMS leadership has intuitively identified a gap
between their current capabilities and the capabilities they will need to stay competitive
in the new defense environment.
The remainder of the model describes how companies can address their Capabilities Gap.
An increase in a Capabilities Gap leads to an increased sense of Urgency within the
company. An increased sense of Urgency will help drive the implementation of a New
Initiative. However, a time Delay is present in the system between the start of a New
Initiative and the time that the Existing Capabilities are increased. If the Existing
Capabilities are increased, the Capabilities Gap will decrease and result in improved
Customer Satisfaction. However, as the New Initiative is rolled out, there will be a short-
term increase in the level of Perceived Improvement that decreases the sense of Urgency.
If the decreased sense of Urgency is believed, the momentum for building up Existing
Capabilities will be lost and the Capabilities Gap will not be addressed.
This portion of the model clearly translates to the need for a long-term commitment and
dedication from the enterprise to truly address changing customer and industry needs to
build new capabilities. This resonates strongly with the implementation of the AMDC
and pursuing its potential to capture the long-term benefits of building a sustainable
competitive advantage for the company. Without strong commitment, the AMDC could
degenerate to a small entity whose potential was never realized.
4.4.2. Managerial Level
As in any organization, the beliefs and policies of managers also help dictate the
relationships and culture within an organization. The second model, shown in Figure 10,
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describes how this community responds to change, particularly the implementation of a
new cost center.
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Figure 10 Manager Level Causal Loop Diagram
This model is generalized to encompass the implementation of a new center providing
services that require significant cultural adjustments. For this research, the new center is
representative of the AMDC whose goals are to modify the product development
methodology to include the identification of manufacturing capability gaps, the creation
of a standard method to address those gaps and the collaboration from managers and
employees within Advanced Programs. Given the scope of this research, the researcher
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had minimal exposure to program managers at RMS. Thus, mental models depicted in
this causal loop diagram are not specific to RMS. The diagram was therefore created
using the author's experience outside of RMS and within academia.
As this causal loop diagram is significantly more complex than the customer model, the
individual parameters are described in Appendix B. The complexity of this environment
creates multiple reinforcing and balancing loops in the diagram. Each loop is given a title
describing the dominant behavior. The model behavior can be described using the various
loops.
For the AMDC to be effective, there must be coordination with development programs in
Advanced Programs. Evaluation of a product design could result in the identification of a
gap in existing manufacturing capabilities to produce the new system. Increased
coordination requires managers to increase their workload, resulting in resistance that is
transferred to their support of the new center (B5 Resistance to More Work).
Collaboration with the AMDC necessitates that development programs have a greater
scope, thereby reducing the manager's level of control (loop B4 Greater Scope Reduces
Control).
A gap in capabilities initiates a new manufacturing development project within the
AMDC and requires investment of resources that would further reduce control on how
discretionary funds are invested (B3 Redirecting Resources Minimizes Control).
Redirecting resources to manufacturing research reduces the amount of funds directed to
meet the program's requirements resulting in an initial decrease in program performance
(B1 Pursuit of New Goals Initially Decreases Program Performance). In addition,
poor performance reflects on the manager's capabilities (B2 Pursuing New Goals
Decreases Perception of Manager's Capabilities) further increasing the resistance to
change. All of the loops described above are balancing loops that describe the system's
desire to remain at the status quo.
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Overcoming the initial resistance to change necessitates reinforcing loops. Two of the
major reinforcing loops found in the model show that (R8) Stakeholder Involvement
Increases Support for the center and that (R5) Support from Management Facilitates
the Internalization of Goals. For the AMDC to benefit from these reinforcing loops, a
concerted effort must be made to involve all stakeholders in the implementation and
development of the new center. Ensuring that their opinions and concerns are heard and
understood by the AMDC will facilitate obtaining their buy-in and support. In addition,
(R7) Sharing Information Reduces Resistance of the stakeholders. By being aware of
the internal and external drivers that are shaping the new center, they will more likely
support its efforts. Similarly, a manager that maintains a (R6) Positive Attitude Eases
the Change Process due to a desire to contribute. The ability to see the change process
as a learning opportunity is a personal characteristic that describes a (B7) Manager's
131Personal Drive'.
After a considerable amount of delay in the system, adapting to the new work results in
significant benefits to the organization. Gaining experience with coordination and
collaboration results in (R9) Learning that Increases Competence, (R2) Learning that
Improves Project Cycle Time, and (R3) Learning that Improves Resource
Efficiency. As manufacturing development projects and teams become familiar with the
new work, their competence increases. Competent teams are more efficient and require
less time to complete projects. Competency also results in better use of resources and
investments. (R1) Efficiencies Allow Managers to Redirect Funds as Necessary,
thereby gaining back control over development. After Time, Program Performance
Improves (R4) with learning and efficiency.
4.4.3. Employee Level
As mentioned many times, the benefits of the AMDC can only be fully exploited through
the collaboration between engineering and operations. The final diagram developed for
13 Although loop B6 is a balancing loop according to the standards of causal loop diagrams, it is still a
factor that supports the adoption of a new center. The appendix will expand on this loop.
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this research describes the dynamics of change at the employee level. The relationship
between the two communities, as well as their incentives and skills, are displayed in
Figure 11.
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Figure 11 Employee Level Causal Loop Diagram
Similar to the Manager Level Causal Loop Diagram, a model of the employee level
relationships and their change response is complex. A more detailed description is
included in Appendix C. The initial response at the employee level is to continue to
follow their current beliefs and incentives. The (Bi) Belief that Pure Design Focus
Will Satisfy Customer is prevalent throughout many companies. Managers of product
development programs typically have an engineering background and are primarily
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concerned with advancing product technology. Consequently, management favors
investments in product technology (B4 Bias Toward Design Results in Reduced
Resources for Operations) instead of manufacturing research and consequently sends a
signal to employees about their priorities. Similarly, management's support of
engineering results in an initial resistance to support the AMDC (B2 Management's
Indirect Bias Against New Initiative). Other balancing relationships describe the added
workload that both Engineering and Operations see due to an increase in complexity from
collaborating during development (B3/B5 Increase in Engineering/ Operations
Workload Discourages Support).
In addition to factors uncovered in the management level causal loop diagram, there are a
number of reinforcing loops at the customer level that can be exploited to support the
AMDC. The inherent delays in the system show that eventually, (R2) Long-Term
Customer Dissatisfaction from Pure Design Focus would become apparent.
Demonstrating the industry changes to all levels of the organization would create a sense
of urgency and drive their acceptance of collaborative work. Also, adding accountability
between the two communities would encourage collaboration between the two
communities (R4 Accountability Leads to Initiative Support).
Overcoming the initial delays in the system provides significant benefits to RMS. As in
the management loop, there are leaming benefits gained from continuous experience
(R1/R6 Learning Curve Effects in Engineering/Operations) such as efficiency,
productivity and the development of new skills to improve everyone's contribution to
product development. The model shows that (R3/R5) Collaborative Work Improves
Engineering's/Operations' Contribution to Product Performance.
4.4.4. System Dynamics Results
System Dynamic models were developed to understand the current organizational culture
and the driving forces surrounding the need for manufacturing innovation. The major
drivers of change are external and stem from satisfying changes in customer
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requirements. There are a number of forces that limit the acceptance of change. On a
primary level, available financial investments as well as time constraints limit the
availability of resources to focus on other areas of development such as manufacturing
research. On a cultural level, existing silos and skills prevent employees from expanding
their responsibilities beyond their current state or from building collaborative
relationships across the enterprise. The lack of accountability throughout product
development does not encourage collaboration across the silos. In addition, the inherent
system delays and long product development cycle encourage a short-term focus that
rewards immediate results where long-term plans "waste" current resources and shift
focus away from short-term needs.
There are a number of options that can help overcome an organization's resistance to
change. Creating incentives and accountability would encourage employees to move
outside of their boundaries to collaborate with each other to influence adoption. Delays
inherent in the system require strong leadership to overcome initial barriers and reap the
long-term benefits of collaborative product development.
4.5. Chapter Summary
Chapter four describes the Advanced Manufacturing Development Center as the focus of
manufacturing innovation for RMS. The majority of the chapter is devoted to discussing
the challenges faced in implementing the center. Developing the Three Business Lenses
of Organizational Processes uncovered a number of major issues in introducing change
into an organization. The strategic lens discussed the importance of determining the
organizational fit of the AMDC and how to meet the challenge of manufacturing
innovation. The political lens reveals how the AMDC would challenge the existing
political structure. The cultural lens stresses the need to combine the two distinct
communities of engineering and operations.
System Dynamics was used to visually layout the competitive and cultural environment
of RMS. The causal loop diagrams developed in this study identified potential problems
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in implementing the AMDC as well as different methods to overcome initial
organizational resistance.
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Chapter 5 Industry Analysis
A portion of this research focuses on creating the center's organizational infrastructure
that would best suit the management and development of manufacturing innovation. One
of the tools used extensively by Raytheon's Six Sigma program is benchmarking to
identify best practices throughout different industries. The Raytheon Benchmarking
Handbook states "benchmarking enables us to measure our products, services, and
processes against those of our toughest competitors and best-in-class companies.. .To
achieve Raytheon's vision and strategy to be the best, we must benchmark ourselves
against the best - both inside and outside the company." 13 2
Two benchmarking activities were begun as part pf this research in an effort to build off
of external practices to benefit the development of the AMDC. This chapter includes a
description of the methodology used to gather the benchmarking information as well as a
general summary of the results. Through the benchmarking, two industries,
semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, were identified that are heavily involved in
manufacturing innovation and concurrent process development. These industries are
discussed in detail in this chapter, highlighting the correlations they have with the defense
industry as well as general information on their manufacturing innovation efforts.
5.1. Benchmarking Analysis
Raytheon's Corporate Knowledge Transfer and Benchmarking Office defines
benchmarking as "(1) a process of measuring products, services and practices against
best-in-class companies and world-class practices, [and] (2) Learning from
others.. .fast!"133 Raytheon's active pursuit of benchmarking activities, lends itself to this
research due to the high level of internal knowledge and skills regarding the best way to
proceed with the AMDC.
132 Raytheon Company Internal Benchmarking Handbook, ed. September 2002, pg 5.
13 Raytheon Company Internal Benchmarking Handbook, ed. September 2002, pg 11.
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5.1.1. Gathering Data
Benchmarking efforts for this research were two fold, personal interviews and a
quantitative study. A number of companies within the Leaders for Manufacturing (LFM)
program13 4 network were contacted over electronic mail to identify potential candidates
willing to share their company's efforts in addressing process innovation. Personal
interviews were conducted to establish a rapport with company representatives. This
medium lends itself to tailor the questions based on their response to better understand
product development within a particular industry. Positive responses resulted in roughly
unstructured interviews ranging in duration from fifteen minutes to over an hour. All of
the companies involved in the interview process were large corporations with thousands
of employees and multiple business units, similar to Raytheon. For the purposes of this
thesis, the confidentiality of the contacts and companies involved in the study is
maintained.
The primary goal of these interviews is to understand how manufacturing innovation and
development is viewed across different industries. A sample of questions asked are listed
below
* What leads the product development cycle - product or process innovation?
* How is manufacturing development managed?
* Where does manufacturing development fit into the enterprise?
* What is the current level of in-house process development?
Follow up interviews were also conducted with companies whose practices were
significantly more applicable to AMDC. The information gathered was used to
determine a few high-level best practices among those interviewed.
The quantitative study was initiated to formalize the benchmarking efforts through
Raytheon's Corporate Knowledge Transfer and Benchmarking Office. A questionnaire
134 Leaders for Manufacturing (LFM) is a dual degree Engineering and Management program at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. LFM is a partnership between academia and industry with a number
of companies serving on the operating committee. Graduates of the program form another part of the
network, many employed by partner companies.
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was generated to obtain a top-level view of how manufacturing innovation was managed
throughout the network of companies involved in formal benchmarking partnerships with
Raytheon, some not accessible through the LFM network. The questionnaire consisted of
nineteen questions and is included in Appendix C, along with the results. The
benchmarking office disseminated the questionnaire to the benchmarking offices of
companies within their network, along with Raytheon Missile Systems. Five high-tech
companies outside of RMS responded and the results of the study were tabulated.
5.1.2. Benchmarking Results
Many of the companies involved in the benchmarking studies were found to have vastly
differing strategies to address manufacturing process innovation. The fundamental policy
of most companies is that process development should be considered as important as
product development to have a strong competitive impact. The center's likelihood of
success depends largely on how RMS and AMDC leaders choose to manage innovation.
5.1.2.1. Interview Results
The interviews generated a great deal of information about each company, particularly in
understanding how their product development process is geared to match their industry
needs and constraints. The details of each company's approach to manufacturing
development and innovation varied widely. One of the more difficult aspects of
discussing manufacturing innovation was the unclear definition of what type of
development constituted innovative manufacturing processes. There was ambiguity in
distinguishing between process improvement and process innovation.
Within that ambiguity, the manufacturing process development efforts of different
companies fell in all ranges of the spectrum, some focusing more on incremental process
improvements others on advanced manufacturing research and innovation. The goals of
the companies that participated in manufacturing innovation also differed. Some
companies chose to focus exclusively on generating new processes that provided
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practical applications for their respective companies. Other companies formed research
and development groups that pushed manufacturing technology forward into product
development without a pre-existing need.
Organizationally, a number of companies formed a centralized organization to address
the manufacturing innovation needs of the entire corporation. Others followed a
decentralized approach, allowing each business unit to create their own manufacturing
innovation organization to address their own specific needs. Within either of these
approaches, some of the manufacturing organizations had permanent staffs while the rest
borrowed people from other organizations to rotate through. Staffing needs were filled
with either research scientists, design engineers or manufacturing engineers and mixes
ranged across the spectrum.
There is no evidence to support or oppose any of these decisions. During the interviews,
it was difficult to determine what the specific drivers were that led companies to make
each decision. Many of the decisions companies made in managing innovation are
strategic in nature and are not transferable from one company to another. These are
preferences based on current management, business processes, and market position that
dictate how risk averse a company is and how they will respond to changes in industry. It
is likely that much of a company's history, goals, and previous attempts at manufacturing
innovation also shape their current efforts, either strategically or tactically. As such, none
of their decisions can be deemed correct or incorrect and are simply a general description
of how companies manage manufacturing innovation. Evaluating projects and making
investment decisions is difficult and while most companies recognize the challenge, there
is no proven way to eliminate the systematic uncertainty and risk.
Within those discussions, the main topic that resonated with the AMDC and RMS
leadership was that many companies approached development efforts with strategic
considerations in mind. Decisions on whether or not to pursue a new manufacturing
innovation project should consider the strategic implications for future competitive
advantage. In addition, there were a number of over-arching principles that would be
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useful for RMS in the development of the AMDC. Many companies interviewed had
some form of committees that guided development efforts with strategic considerations in
mind. Many companies created and maintained manufacturing technology roadmaps to
ensure that current development efforts would also satisfy long-term needs. Of the
companies interviewed, many representatives believed development goals and guidelines,
for products and processes, should be dynamic and constantly evaluated to ensure that
efforts are able to continually respond to changes in industry.
5.1.2.2. Quantitative Results
Raytheon's Corporate Benchmarking Office gathered and compiled the questionnaire
answers. All companies in the study did not rate themselves highly on their integration of
manufacturing with product development cycle. Most respondents have active, cutting
edge manufacturing technology approaches and have been involved in advanced
manufacturing technology research for a significant period of time. Similar to the
interview study, most companies used manufacturing technology roadmaps to guide
manufacturing development or investment. In addition, most had standard processes to
develop and fund manufacturing technology and transition products to production.
All respondents stated funding for manufacturing research comes from overhead pools
except Raytheon who receives program funding for manufacturing development.
However, programs have the option to support manufacturing development or provide
funding requests. Funding profiles - the mix of how companies support existing product
lines, products in development of manufacturing innovation research - vary widely.
Commercial businesses tend to provide more funding to products in development.
Similar to the interview study results, it is difficult to determine which, if any, of these
companies have a best practice approach to manufacturing innovation. The questionnaire
could be interpreted in a number of different ways depending on the individual that is
responding for their company. However, the main goal of creating a quantitative
benchmarking study was to open the official benchmarking channels of other companies.
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The final question formally asks companies if they are willing to continue benchmarking
by providing additional information or hosting RMS for a site visit. The majority of
respondents asserted they are willing to continue to explore the topic of manufacturing
innovation with RMS. In addition, a quantitative study paints a clear picture of where
RMS stands in comparison to other companies and may help create a sense of urgency.
5.2. Industry Analysis
Companies face different challenges depending on their markets and industry. There are
many differences across industries that help mold a company. Because of those different
factors, companies within a specific industry respond to them differently and establish
unique characteristics compared to companies in other industries.
The different industries involved in the interview portion of the benchmarking study were
analyzed to determine correlations and applicability within the defense industry. Table 5
summarizes the industry analysis, including the information most pertinent to this study.
Industry Aerospace Automotive Consumer Defense Biotech/ Semi-
Products Pharma conductor
Drives Duald ve n Product Product Dpas Product Product Processdevelopment emphasis Cr
Product Mature Mostly Wide Mostly Wide range Young
maturity mature range matu
Prod. Dev. Years/
Cycle Time Decades Years Months decades Years Few Years
Competition Intense Very Very Very
Oligopoly International comp- Oligopoly comp- comp-
Comp. etitive y---eie etitive
Other Strong Strong
Notable Info (government government
\',reglto reulti
Table 5 Summary of Industry Analysis
The intent of the comparison is to focus further benchmarking efforts and invest
additional resources in understanding those industries. RMS would increase their
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learning by conducting benchmarking site visits that include direct contact between
leaders with the pertinent information. The top-level industry analysis highlights two
industries that are more likely to aid RMS in the development of the AMDC:
Semiconductors and Biotechnology/Pharmaceuticals.
5.2.1. Semiconductor Industry
The semiconductor industry is defined by Hoover's as companies "engaged in diversified
manufacturing activities, offering a product line of integrated circuits, microprocessors,
logic devices, chipsets and memory chips for a wide variety of users including telecom,
computer networking, wireless, and other instrumentation industries."' 3 5 The
semiconductor industry is often highlighted as having strong process development
capabilities. It is this latter reputation of developing new manufacturing processes for
each new product that makes the semiconductor industry of particular interest. It is very
likely that they have developed a standard methodology to research, develop, and
implement advanced manufacturing processes.
To better understand the industry and the applicability to their advanced manufacturing
efforts, it is necessary to understand their competitive environment. The semiconductor
industry has formed an international coalition to have a better grasp on the industry-wide
technological challenges they face.
"The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) is an
assessment of the semiconductor technology requirements.. .to ensure
advancements in the performance of integrated circuits. [ITRS] is a
cooperative effort of the global industry manufacturers and suppliers,
government organizations, consortia, and universities."
This international roadmap sets the bar for competitive technological development in
semiconductor companies. Each year, creation of the roadmap entails debate among the
participants to determine the "industry drivers, requirements, and technology
135 Hoover's On-line - Semiconductor Industry (accessed on January 2003); available on
www.hoovers.com.
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timelines".136 The roadmap includes product performance and characteristics as well as
the process capabilities required to meet those needs.
Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, observed that "the number of transistors per square
inch on integrated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated circuit was
invented." He extended this observation to predict that the trend would continue, a
technology trend - termed Moore's Law. Although the rate of improvement has slowed,
modifying Moore's law to 18 months, it is still a widely held belief of the capabilities of
the technology and serves as a development goal for companies in this industry.1 37
Design efforts by all semiconductor companies to meet Moore's law focus largely on the
reduction of transistor size. In addition, major design efforts work to increase the wafer
diameter size. The variables of transistor and wafer size are driven by the development
of new manufacturing capabilities. "Product innovation in semiconductors depends on
process innovation to a greater extent than is true of many other industries, since
semiconductor product innovations frequently require major changes in manufacturing
processes.",3 8 A company's future competitive standing in this industry is directly linked
to their ability to manage and develop new manufacturing capabilities.
Semiconductor companies must pursue manufacturing innovation other than to meet
Moore's law. The development capabilities of semiconductor companies are quickly
reaching their limits. Products in this industry typically have a market life of two to four
years at which point they become obsolete. The product development cycle requires an
average of three to five years for completion. Recall that proficiency in manufacturing
innovation allows a company to reduce their product development cycle time, improving
their ability to match if not exceed the obsolescence rate with their product introduction
rate. Facing intense competition in the industry, companies that are first to introduce a
136 International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (accessed October 2002); available on
http://public.itrs.net/.
" Webopedia, on-line encyclopedia (accessed January 2003); available on
http://vww.webopedia.com/TERM/M/Moores Law.html.
]3 Nile W. Hatch and David. C. Mowery, "Process Innovation and Learning by Doing in Semiconductor
Manufacturing," Management Science 44, no. 11 (Nov 1998), pg 1462.
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product to the market can achieve significant benefits such as capturing market share,
increasing sales, and setting new product standards across the industry.
Using Pisano's framework, products within the semiconductor industry fall into the
Process Enabling category. As such, product innovations require a high degree of
process innovation as well as product innovation to bring them to market. One company
in particular has successfully redefined their organization to improve their product
development methodology. A general description of their organization is shown in .
Figure 12.
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Figure 12 Organization of a Semiconductor Company1
The three major organizations within this company are the Product Organization, the
Process Organization and the Manufacturing Organization. All three groups are deeply
involved in the development of new products, requiring intense levels of coordination
and collaboration between the three. The Process Organization leads most development
efforts since the main driver, or constraint, of new products is a company's ability to
reduce the feature size (transistor size). As previously mentioned, the ability to change
feature or wafer size is directly driven by actively managing manufacturing innovation.
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The Process Organization is not concerned with product performance; that is the main
goal of the Product Organization. The Product Organization's goal is to create products
that match customer's needs while fitting within the process capabilities, either existing
or in development. The Manufacturing Organization is responsible for the final
production and is the user of all manufacturing processes developed within the Process
Organization. The Manufacturing Organization keeps established industry standards and
constraints, ensuring that all new products and processes do not infringe them.
The development of new products includes accountability between all three entities. A
high degree of accountability ensures the stakeholders will coordinate their efforts instead
of throwing designs, specification, and requirements over the wall. In order to create a
new product that (1) pushes the limits of technology, (2) delivers the performance and
capabilities to the customer, and (3) is manufacturable at a low cost with a high yield, all
three groups must be involved in development. To some degree, RMS is striving to
achieve all of these results with the AMDC.
While a number of different interviews were conducted with representatives of this
company it was difficult to obtain pertinent information. For example, RMS would
benefit from obtaining a more detailed description of how the three organizations
collaborate and the accountability involved for a deeper understanding of the relationship
and culture at this semiconductor company. Ideally, a historical account of the product
development methodology before process development led all development efforts would
help RMS obtain a better grasp of the changes in their company. Similarly, it would help
to identify the factors that drove them to change and the lessons learned while changing
the organization. This type of information would provide a better context to evaluate the
effectiveness of their change efforts and the benefits they obtained. In addition, the
AMDC would directly benefit from a description of the facilities, the process
development environment and incentives offered to employees. The above information
would be more readily obtained through formal relationships and benchmarking site
visits at this company.
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5.2.2. Biotechnology & Pharmaceutical Industry
The industry that correlates most with defense is the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industry. The pharmaceutical industry includes manufacturers and distributors offering
"a broad and diverse line of drug and health care products; these industry leaders that
have made a significant commitment to the research and development of a long pipeline
of drugs."140 "The Biotech industry includes companies engaged in drug discovery and
production, research, and biologically engineered food."1 41  The pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industry have the same basic phases of product development shown in
Figure 13.
Discovery Pre-clinical Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Launch
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Figure 13 Phases in Drug Development 142
The primary difference between the two types of industries is the methodology by which
new drugs are discovered and manufactured. Traditional pharmaceutical companies use
chemically synthesized organic molecules to create new compounds. Historically,
pharmaceutical companies would randomly screen their compound library to search for
compounds that were effective in treating an illness. Often, in the search for a treatment
of illness X, a compound would be accidentally discovered to treat illness Y. In recent
years, the pharmaceutical industry has turned to rational drug design, working backwards
140 Hoover's On-line - Pharmaceutical industry (accessed on January 2003); available on
www.hoovers.com.
141 Hoover's On-line - Biotechnology Industry (accessed on January 2003); available on
www.hoovers.com.
142 Benchmarking interview
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from a detailed knowledge of a disease's biochemistry to determine what chemical
compounds can inhibit the chemical reaction involved. 4 3
The biotechnology industry uses synthesized protein molecules to create new treatments.
Discovery of new treatments is much more systematic than the random screening process
of traditional pharmaceutical. Biotech companies use molecular biology to study
diseases at the cell level and identify potential treatment. Genetic engineering allows
scientists to manipulate the genetic structure of cells to produce certain proteins, thereby
manufacturing the critical treatment.14 4
Once a compound appears to have promising results in a laboratory environment, pre-
clinical development begins. This phase requires a slightly larger quantity of the
compound to perform experiments on animals and determine the appropriate activity
occurs within living species. If the results are positive, the compound moves on to the
first phase of clinical trials. Phase I ensures that the compound does not cause adverse
reactions and are tested on a small number of healthy humans. A slightly larger amount
of testing material is needed in each subsequent phase. Successful Phase I trials moves
testing to Phase II.
In Phase II, the compound is tested on a subset of individuals who are afflicted with the
disease. Phase II is focused on determining the possible side effects as well as the
appropriate dosage levels. Phase III tests the efficacy of a drug in larger human trials,
requiring a significant scale up in manufacturing capacity. Once thorough clinical trials
have occurred, a company will file a request to the FDA to release the drug to the market.
If the FDA request is approved, the company will then launch the product and begin
manufacturing and marketing the drug. The funnel effect is used to describe the dramatic
reduction of the number of drugs in development due in large part to the rigorous tests
and limited financial resources to pursue all potential compounds.
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141 Pisano (1997), pgs 55, 64
144 Pisano (1997), pg 68-69
As mentioned earlier, each phase of development requires rigorous tests and it is
necessary to begin producing small quantities of the drug very early in development.
Figure 14 illustrates the different requirements for manufacturing processes at each phase
of development.
Upstream Purification Downstream
*Develop the synthesis *Determine how to *Responsible for the
required to purify the molecule at physical delivery of
manufacture the each phase for testing the drug (pill, needle,
molecule, protein or (improve yield) etc.)
cell
Figure 14 Process Requirements in Each Phase of Drug Development145
As the scale of production increases, additional research must be conducted to reduce
process complexity, improve manufacturing yields to deliver the appropriate amount of
material for testing and eventual production.
Process research typically begins during the pre-clinical development phase and involves
lab-scale production of the drug. Production quantities range from one gram to one
kilogram. Pilot development begins near Phase I of the clinical trials. The manufacturing
process is evaluated in a pilot plant and the design of the equipment and facility occurs.
Production levels of the pilot plant range from one kilogram to 100 kilograms. Near
Phase III, the process is transferred to a commercial plant and the manufacturing
environment is validated. The FDA requires full development of manufacturing
processes before submitting a request for approval. Artificially simulating the
manufacturing environment is not sufficient; it is necessary to physically create the
manufacturing facilities that will produce the drug to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
manufacturing process. Production levels range from 100 kilograms to metric tons of the
material once the product is launched.14 6
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The biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies undertake high risks in their product
development. Only one in eight to ten thousand compounds from the discovery phase
reach the market. "A new product must have peak sales of over $200 million a year to
recoup research and development costs." 4 1 Investments in new manufacturing facilities
range from $100 to $400 million dollars and are ready to begin production and release the
drug to the market on the day approval is granted. However, FDA approval is not
guaranteed and companies have been left with a useless facility that requires additional
investment to retrofit for the next potential drug.148
Of all of the companies involved in the benchmarking study, the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industry is a better match for RMS. In comparing the two industries, a
number of similarities surfaced between them and the goals of the AMDC. Within
biotech/pharmaceutical, the product and process development efforts are tightly linked
requiring new manufacturing processes for each new compound. As in defense, the
product's requirements drive development efforts, i.e. the discovery of a new compound
in biotechnology or pharmaceuticals. Both industries face long product development
cycles and a stringent qualification of product requirements. In addition, there is a
significant amount of government regulation in each industry. Both industries cope with
high financial risks during development and have a similar gating process to evaluate
projects at different stages development.
There are a number of differences that distinguish defense from biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals. Although both industries face stringent government regulations, the
defense industry is protected by the structure of their business. The government provides
funding for a large portion of research and development costs, minimizing the
development risks for defense companies. In addition, defense systems are low volume
production compared with blockbuster drugs and have less opportunity to obtain
economies of scale. Unlike biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, defense
14' A. Webster and V. Swain, "The Pharmaceutical Industry: Towards a New Innovative
Environment," Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 3, no 2 (1991), pg 131-132.
148 Pisano (1997), pg 73
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companies can validate the performance of a product while allowing a considerable
amount of leverage to modify the manufacturing processes.
Currently, the biotech/pharmaceutical industry is undergoing a transformation requiring
them to introduce drugs with significant therapeutic improvements. Intense industry
competition stresses the importance of being first to market and thereby requires
companies to reduce their development time. Decreased price flexibility in the industry
and shorter market lives of new drugs results in lower margins. The speed at which other
companies enter the same market also reduces the time for the original company to
generate a blockbuster profit to recuperate the large development investments. These
results highlight a company's need to lower their development costs to remain
competitive. 14 9 Similar to the defense industry, the biotech/pharmaceutical industry is
undergoing a "Better, Faster, Cheaper" revolution. Faced with similar pressures,
Raytheon and the biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies would benefit from
learning how the other addresses a changing industry.
5.2.3. Industry Results
In further studying this industry, benchmarking efforts should focus on building
collaborative relationships with pharmaceutical companies. Although, biotechnology
companies face similar development issues as pharmaceutical companies, they are
smaller and younger. Many pharmaceutical companies have been in the drug
development business for decades and have accumulated a wealth of experience. In a
larger organization, such as traditional pharmaceutical companies, managing technology
development while coordinating limited resources is more challenging. Large
organizations usually separate and compartmentalize responsibilities and tasks into
distinct organizations requiring coordination during development.
A pharmaceutical company's experience should result in a stronger drive toward
identifying best practices and standardizing proven methods to proceed at each phase. In
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addition, they are likely to have established an evaluation method to prioritize
development efforts and strategically allocate resources. The challenges that both
defense and pharmaceutical companies face in the changing environment are numerous
and both are likely to benefit from creating a collaborative learning relationship.
Additional research in either of these companies would provide RMS with more useful
information. Site visits, in particular, would be ideal; however pursuing these efforts
during the course of this research exhausted the resources of the researcher. Sufficient
interest could not be generated from companies in either industry to invest additional
time or resources to host RMS. The disinterest could stem from a distrust of RMS
attempting to gather sensitive, competitive information. However, there is no overlap in
the types of products developed in each industry. More importantly, benchmarking is
typically a quid pro quo and there may be limited interest by other companies to learn
from RMS because there is a limited transparent correlation.
5.3. Chapter Summary
A number of general practices obtained through benchmarking are readily applicable to
the AMDC such as establishing a committee and creating a roadmap to guide
manufacturing innovation. The LFM network is well suited to meet the needs of the
interview portion of the benchmarking activities as participation by company contacts
required minimal time and investment. However, attempts made to organize site visits
were lost. LFM representatives may not have the right contacts or influence to commit
their company to a site visit. Involving Raytheon's Benchmarking Office in a
quantitative study engages other benchmarking offices that are familiar with the
benchmarking process and benefits for their company.
The information gathered in phone interviews was top level in nature and summarized the
manufacturing development efforts at these companies. The main result of the
quantitative study was a formal acceptance by a number of companies to continue to
address the topic of manufacturing innovation through additional benchmarking.
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Additional analysis identified specific industries that have a higher correlation with the
defense industries and are facing issues similar to Raytheon's. Further benchmarking and
analysis of these would yield more useful information.
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Chapter 6 AMDC Operational Model
For this research, an operational model was developed to provide a general framework to
facilitate the management and development of manufacturing technologies. A model can
be created for the AMDC by using information gathered from other companies and
academics on the topics of manufacturing innovation and technology management. The
information used to develop the AMDC operational model was derived from a wide
variety of sources, particularly from the benchmarking activities and industry analysis,
common practices in implementing sustainable change and academic research on creating
effective teams. This chapter is intended to serve as a stand-alone guide for the AMDC
and RMS to use to effectively manage manufacturing process research and innovation.
The model is intended to be dynamic with continual evaluation by the AMDC to ensure
the changing needs of RMS are being met.
The AMDC operational model includes five distinct stages that should occur continually
and concurrently once the center reached a steady stage. The five stages of
manufacturing innovation include Identify Manufacturing Technology Needs, Plan
Manufacturing Technology Development, Manage the AMDC, Develop & Validate New
Manufacturing Technology, and Create Rapid Manufacturing Development Capabilities.
Figure 15 displays a visual representation of the operational model including each of the
five stages and major tasks within each.
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Identify Manufacturing Technology Needs
Collaborate w/ Match Tech Connect to
Adv Programs Roadmaps Research Centers
Plan Manufacturing Technology Development
Develop Mfg Create Mfg Maintain Mfg
Tech Committee Dev Strategy Tech Roadmaps
Manage the AMDC
Generate & Approve Manage, Facilitate
Allocate Resources Projects & Evaluate Dev
Develop & Validate New Manufacturing Technology
Collaborate w/ Research Create Prototypes
Product Dev. Alternatives & Mfg Layout
Create Rapid Manufacturing Development Capabilities
Document Methodology Transfer
Efforts Improved by Learning Knowledge
Figure 15 AMDC Operational Model
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6.1. Identify Manufacturing Technology Needs
The AMDC intends to pursue development projects that address internal manufacturing
technology needs by providing practical solutions. Technology and development within
the AMDC must be pulled from customer needs. The AMDC can access distinct avenues
within Advanced Programs to identify specific manufacturing technology needs. The
majority of Advanced Program work is the development of new defense systems based
on new product technologies. System development within each program is at varying
degrees of completion.
While the technology and the design of the systems are likely to be in a state of flux, it is
possible to extrapolate the major manufacturing technology needs by analyzing general
system requirements. For example, a missile system that uses lasers for guidance will
require the precision assembly of optical lenses. Manufacturing innovation efforts can
focus on developing a practical solution that will deliver the design requirements without
needing to know the specific design details since "the goal of process research is to
define the basic architecture of the process."15 0
If the development of a new system has progressed in its level of detail, it is possible to
evaluate the design and identify the manufacturing capabilities needed for producing that
system. In doing so, a preliminary bill of processes is created that can compare the
required manufacturing capabilities with existing capabilities. Gaps would highlight the
manufacturing technologies that must be developed. Evaluating the manufacturing needs
of a design before it is transferred to production facilitates subsequent tasks and improves
the transition process. For example, the bill of processes could serve as an outline to
create detailed work instructions for line operators in the factory.
If a development program has advanced significantly, the potential impact of
manufacturing research is reduced. At this stage, designs are more complete and it
150 Gary P. Pisano, "Knowledge, Integration, and the Locus of Learning: An Empirical Analysis of Process
Development," Strategic Management Journal 15, Special issue: Competitive Organizational Behavior
(1994), pg 80.
- 111 -
becomes more difficult and costly to modify - limiting the ability to reach an optimal
system solution that balances product and process requirements. In addition, delaying
manufacturing innovation to later stages of development could delay the delivery of a
system if inadequate time is allotted to develop new manufacturing capabilities. The
identification of manufacturing technology needs is dynamic and must become an
integral part of product development.
Other avenues that the AMDC can access to identify manufacturing technology needs are
corporate research centers and RMS technologists. Throughout Raytheon, there are
multiple corporate centers that research and develop new technologies. Typically,
research is focused on advancing product technologies that may be developed into new
defense systems ten to fifteen years in the future. Internal RMS technologists collaborate
with research centers throughout the enterprise to manage research and development at
the business unit level. Technologists are concerned with finding practical applications
of the new technology within new defense systems. Internal research tends to focus on
further development of technologies that may be used eight to ten years in the future.
Senior technical leads within Advanced Programs are responsible for creating product
technology roadmaps that forecast what technologies, within different systems, are likely
to be applicable in five to ten years. Note that the early stages of proposal work look for
correlations between product technology in the research pipeline and the ability to apply
the technology to meet the customer's needs. Roadmaps outline the product technologies
that are in development, the subsystems that can use the technology, and the system
architectures or product platforms that will use the subsystems. RMS technologists are
'keepers' of the internal technology roadmaps as an extension of their link between
corporate research centers and internal development programs.
The last two avenues plan product technology on a long-term basis. It is precisely their
forward thinking that lends them to coordinate with the AMDC to identify future
manufacturing technology needs. One final avenue that the AMDC can access for
additional work is Raytheon's supply chain. Once the center becomes proficient at
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developing new manufacturing capabilities, their skills can be used to aid suppliers;
positively impacting long-term supplier relationships as well as improved subsystem
designs and production. Overall, the identification of manufacturing technology needs
should be dynamic and become an integral part of product development to be able to
initiate internal manufacturing research that will benefit the entire enterprise.
6.2. Plan Manufacturing Technology Development
A significant factor in the success of the AMDC is the organization's ability to
strategically guide development. A focus on strategic rather than tactical development
would result in greater impact and efficacy of the AMDC. A strategic plan would
generate balance between short and long-term goals as well as present a number of
solutions that address the strategic and political concerns that surfaced in the three lenses.
6.2.1. Manufacturing Technology Committee
The purpose of a Manufacturing Technology Committee is to provide an enterprise level
view of development efforts to allow for global optimization of investments in
manufacturing innovation. Representatives of the committee should understand the
larger business context and be able to gauge the potential impact of projects to help guide
development efforts and maintain the Manufacturing Technology Roadmap. Details of
the roadmap are included in a subsequent section. In addition, incorporating members
whose interests are representative of the enterprise would provide a forum for
stakeholders to express their viewpoints. The committee would serve as a formal
network for representatives to exchange information with other organizations. Including
stakeholders in the committee membership would ensure that their concerns and needs
are taken into consideration in the decisions of the AMDC and would consequently align
their interests and agendas with the new center.
The committee should be composed of senior leaders throughout RMS that can influence
their organizations and have a perspective of overall enterprise and new business
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opportunities. The primary stakeholders that should be involved in the committee,
particularly representatives from engineering and operations. "To have the capability to
develop and simulate processes outside the factory, an R&D laboratory needs deep
scientific knowledge about the technology as well as detailed knowledge about how the
factory actually operates."15 1  Engineering leaders would bring a familiarity of the
program development efforts; a general awareness of their manufacturing technology
needs and of the criticality of developing new capabilities to match those needs. Leaders
from operations would bring knowledge of the existing manufacturing capabilities as
well as knowledge of the factory environment and skills of the end users. In particular,
representatives from operations would have the skills to evaluate programs in
development and further assess their manufacturing technology needs. The AMDC
manager would serve as the head of the Manufacturing Technology Committee.
6.2.2. Manufacturing Technology Roadmap
Once a list of manufacturing technology needs has been created, it is necessary to create a
strategic, long-term plan to address those needs. Similar to product technology
roadmaps, a Manufacturing Technology Roadmap can be used to encompass
development efforts and include critical information. For example, the roadmap can
include the priority and urgency for developing each new capability as well as the amount
of resources required for development such as equipment that a project would require. In
addition, the feasibility of a manufacturing technology development project should be
evaluated to determine if in-house development makes strategic and business sense and is
achievable within the available development time, budget and staff.
Creating a roadmap requires identifying each project's timeline in terms of how long
development should take and assessing the appropriate time for manufacturing
development to begin. The Manufacturing Technology Roadmap can be used to ensure
that all development efforts are directly tied to a customer need. In addition, a clear and
151 Gary P. Pisano, "Learning-Before-Doing in the Development of New Process Technology," Research
Policy 25 (1996), pg 1099
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concise document would facilitate identifying synergies between programs so that similar
needs are addressed simultaneously; eliminating duplicate efforts, maximizing return on
investment, and allowing for technology re-use.
The creation of a Manufacturing Technology Roadmap should begin by building from the
existing Product Technology Roadmaps. As mentioned earlier, specific manufacturing
technology needs can be extrapolated from product technologies included on product
roadmaps. Ensuring that research and development, in both the performance and
manufacturing aspects of a technology, proceeds simultaneously improves the overall
quality of product development. More specifically, the roadmaps allow a succinct
method to match research investments proportionately between the two, promoting
concurrent development efforts across the enterprise.
Due to the proprietary nature of the Manufacturing Technology Roadmap, the content
and author's efforts are not included in this thesis. However, the Manufacturing
Technology Roadmap highlights development projects that can generate early successes
along with projects that focus on critical, long-term technology needs
6.2.3. Manufacturing Development Strategy
A Manufacturing Development Strategy is a systematic method to evaluate projects
strategically. This strategy should evaluate the manufacturing technology needs to
facilitate project prioritization and resource allocation when making development
investment decisions. A manufacturing development strategy could balance development
efforts between short-term, low risk projects and long-term projects with inherently a
higher risk. Traditional financial analysis, particularly return on investment calculations,
favors incremental projects that produce short-term benefits. A manufacturing
development strategy would help counter the risk-averse tendencies.
One possible tool is to determine the strategic implications of pursuing each project by
answering questions such as those listed below:
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* What are the strategic contributions of pursuing this project?
* What are the competitive implications of pursuing this project?
* Are competitors developing or mastering similar manufacturing capabilities?
Questions of this nature would allow development decisions to incorporate both financial
and strategic concerns. A Manufacturing Development Strategy could also incorporate
general guidelines to evaluate projects. "A central problem in managing and investing in
innovations is determining whether and how to continue a development effort in the
absence of concrete performance information.""' Initially, it will be difficult to gauge
the appropriate length of time and resources each development project should require.
Evaluation of projects will have to be based on the innovativeness and simplicity of the
solution, the practicality and robustness of use, the low cost of implementation and
production, and the resulting manufacturing yield.
To echo the sentiments of the benchmarking interviews, it is important for development
to remain dynamic. A strategy should be continually evaluated and updated to ensure that
it does not become antiquated. In addition, as more projects are completed, the center
will develop knowledge and standards for developing new technologies that will likely
impact the development and evaluation strategy.
6.3. Manage the AMDC
Primarily, AMDC management is responsible for the day-to-day operation as well as
ensuring the long-term sustainability of the center. As the leader of the Manufacturing
Technology Committee, the AMDC manager helps create the Manufacturing Technology
Roadmap and uses it to initiate manufacturing development projects. In addition, AMDC
management is responsible for generating new business for the center to ensure that the
needs across the enterprise are continually being addressed.
152 Andrew H. Van de Ven and Douglas Polley, "Learning While Innovating," Organization Science 3, no.
1 (Feb 1992), pg 92.
-116-
The AMDC manager has a number of major responsibilities surrounding the management
of innovation. AMDC management controls the pool of resources to develop
manufacturing technology. While identifying manufacturing technology needs, resources
to invest in development projects should be identified concurrently. The AMDC
manager is responsible for generating internal and external funding. In addition, they are
responsible for allocating resources to fund development projects.
One of the management's responsibilities is to facilitate the development of new
manufacturing technologies. The basic needs of development projects are to have
adequate lab facilities and equipment to allow for innovation and experimentation. In
addition, it is necessary to create an appropriate environment to encourage innovation,
learning, and collaboration. In essence, the AMDC is an opportunity to create a learning
organization to encourage innovation. Schein believes that people "cannot learn
something fundamentally new if [they] don't have the time, the resources, coaching, and
valid feedback on how [they] are doing. Practice fields are particularly important so that
[they] can make mistakes and learn from them without disrupting the organization." 53
As described in earlier sections, building the appropriate environment allows
development project teams to experiment and make mistakes without repercussions.
Instead, mistakes should be seen as opportunities to learn.
Once approval has been granted and funding is secured, the AMDC manager can
assemble a team for each development project. A key part of creating and maintaining a
learning atmosphere within the AMDC is to identify employees that can thrive and will
reinforce this environment while developing new manufacturing technologies. To
facilitate selection of employees, specific criteria should be established that highlight an
individual's ability to be effective within the AMDC.
Because projects are developed by teams, employees should be able to function
effectively with a team. A team member should be able to communicate and collaborate
across disciplinary boundaries.
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Communication is a critical step in combining the inputs from the customer and user to
ensure that any new manufacturing technology effectively meets their needs. Similarly,
effective communication would allow team members to understand the needs and
priorities of the external customer further downstream. Collaboration would allow
concurrent development efforts between manufacturing technology development and
product technology development, resulting in an optimal defense system. In addition, a
team member should be able to understand the science behind the product and process
technology to identify and work around inherent constraints.
In order to attract the right employees to the AMDC, appropriate incentives must be set.
The most common form of incentives within development projects is to challenge
employees to work on something new and interesting. In addition, to "reward people for
creative ideas.. .provide open communication channels, and encourage different and
unusual points of view would both attract and develop more creative people."15 4 For
incentives to be effective, performance measurement metrics must be carefully set. Both
individual and team performance must be evaluated based not only on their ability to
develop a new manufacturing capability but also on the methodology by which they
reached a solution. Metrics that evaluate communication, collaboration, creativity and
innovativeness, however are subjective in nature. Team members must be comfortable
with subjective evaluations and trust that they are appropriately recognized and rewarded
for their efforts. Involving team members in developing metrics and evaluating each
other's performance can facilitate acceptance of the metrics.
AMDC management is responsible for ensuring that employees involved in
manufacturing research and development projects are pursuing a challenging and
respectable career alternative. In the current culture, product technology development
and employees in that area receive higher levels of credibility. Because manufacturing
development projects require collaboration with product development, the AMDC must
154 Kenneth E. Knight, "A Descriptive Model of the Intra-Firm Innovation Process," The Journal of
Business 40, no. 4 (Oct 1967), pg 481.
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work to establish a reputation and gain credibility within RMS for their efforts.
Acceptance of the center would encourage employees across the enterprise to become
involved in manufacturing development projects as needed as well as encourage
Advanced Programs and other business units to seek the AMDC to help address their
manufacturing capability needs.
Finally, AMDC management should facilitate the transfer of knowledge from within the
AMDC to the rest of Raytheon, to customers, to government agencies that support
manufacturing innovation, to suppliers and to the industry. Sharing information on the
efforts of the AMDC would benefit the center in a number of ways. Internally, RMS
would directly benefit from the development of new capabilities. Capturing lessons
learned and transferring them to subsequent teams will facilitate their progress. To build
internal acceptance of the center, team members should also be encouraged to
disseminate information throughout their home organizations. Within RMS, the most
common form to generate new business for internal centers is through word of mouth.
Disseminating information regarding the success stories of the AMDC would raise the
level of awareness and ensure the continued support of the internal customers.
Development successes should also be shared with customers and government agencies
to build or ensure their continued support, particularly financial, of the center. Informing
major suppliers of the AMDC's current efforts to innovate manufacturing technologies
sends a signal of RMS' commitment to improving their internal capabilities and begins to
lay the groundwork to extend the effort into the supply chain. Obtaining support from
suppliers would facilitate future relationship with the AMDC as well as encourage
suppliers to build their own internal manufacturing development capabilities. Informing
the industry of RMS efforts in manufacturing innovation would bring credibility to the
organization and would build upon their existing reputation. All of these efforts would
ensure that the AMDC becomes a competitive advantage for Raytheon.
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6.4. Develop & Validate New Manufacturing Technology
The responsibility of developing new manufacturing technology falls on employees of
RMS. Manufacturing innovation requires employees that possess a number of basic
attributes. Primarily, employees should be creative and open-minded. Employees should
be able to think outside of the current capabilities and not be constrained by the status
quo during development. Creative solutions require employees to explore and
experiment with different technology alternatives. Because development will generally
occur within teams, the AMDC should be staffed with employees who are comfortable
being part of a group effort and can be productive, contributing members.
In addition, employees should be able to communicate across boundaries on several
levels. "Teams engage in vertical communication aimed at molding the views of top
management, horizontal communication aimed at coordinating work and obtaining
feedback, and horizontal communication aimed at general scanning of the technical and
market environment."15 5  Effective communication skills facilitate and accelerate
development since teams can ask for and receive feedback quickly. Employee flexibility
within the AMDC is also necessary for a number of reasons. Flexibility is required for
employees joining a new organization that while it is learning and defining itself it
undergoes significant changes. As mentioned earlier, product development is constantly
evolving, making the development of manufacturing technology aim at a moving target.
With continual changes in customer needs, employees should be responsive to project
level uncertainty.
Due to the high level of uncertainty and lack of pre-existing standards in manufacturing
development, teams should be able provide input for their evaluation. Establishing the
AMDC creates a new opportunity for development, however, it is difficult to assess the
success of a project mid-stream and the viability of continuing development. In addition,
it is necessary to evaluate team progress and individual contributions to the creation of
new manufacturing technologies. Encouraging team members to develop their own
155 Deborah G. Ancona and David F. Caldwell, "Bridging the Boundary: External Activity and
Performance in Organizational Teams" Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, no. 4 (Dec., 1992), pg 634.
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metrics gives teams an additional stake in ensuring the success of the project since they
know they are not measured by arbitrary standards. However, "it is essential to have
reward and discipline systems and organizational structures consistent with the new way
of thinking and working." 56 For example, evaluating employees based on their ability to
quickly complete a project will result in employees settling for incremental
improvements to current inadequate capabilities rather than discovering radical new
technologies that match the customer's needs.
During development, teams are responsible for researching potential solutions to meet the
manufacturing needs of a new system. Research would allow teams to identify existing
manufacturing technology alternatives both internal and external to Raytheon. These
research efforts prevent teams from duplicating technology that is readily available.
Essentially, teams should conduct a technology benchmarking search to identify pre-
existing capabilities. Outside of these suggestions, teams should be free to discover their
own methodology for developing new manufacturing technologies. Limiting the way a
team should operate reduces their ability to exploit their own expertise whether it is to
explore the science behind new technologies or by experimentation. Each development
project is essentially a learning opportunity for teams and the center. "Everyone learns
slightly differently, so it is essential to involve learners in designing their own optimal
learning process." 157 However, too much flexibility may lead to inefficient teams with
minimal direction.
The research and development of new manufacturing technologies is accomplished
through teams made up of cross-functional and multi-disciplinary employees. Integration
across functional boundaries is critical for successful process development across system
and component interfaces, between different scientific and knowledge bases, across
sequences of projects, between R&D and manufacturing.158 It is a challenging endeavor
to get people from two distinct cultures to work together. The skills necessary to develop
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new manufacturing technology come from employees within both the engineering and
the manufacturing community. Engineers are aware of program needs and have strong
technology development skills. Manufacturing brings knowledge of existing capabilities
and needs of the end user. Both communities have distinct cultures and assumptions
about their role in the company. Changing the product development methodology,
embodied in the new center, requires their collaboration.
AMDC teams must collaborate with product development to modify the system design as
needed. "The relationship between upstream [product design] and downstream groups
[process design] must support and reinforce early and frequent exchange of constraints,
ideas, and objectives. Moreover, because problem solving across traditional functional
boundaries occurs in real time, the capacity for quick and effective action is critical."15 9
Much of this thesis focuses on the need to ensure collaboration across traditional
boundaries and encourage new system development to encompass the engineering and
manufacturing communities. The causal loop diagrams developed in Section 4.4 show
that accountability between the two communities will encourage collaboration. "Mutual
trust and joint responsibility are essential to integrated problem solving."l6 0 Establishing
accountability between Advanced Programs and the AMDC would ensure that the two
reach an optimal system design where the manufacturing risks have been effectively
eliminated.
An ideal staffing arrangement for the AMDC is to have employees that rotate into and
out of the center. While periodically rotating employees would be difficult to coordinate,
RMS would benefit from exposing many different employees to the center. Participation
in manufacturing technology innovation would widen the knowledge base and skills of
each employee. In addition, it would provide employees with an awareness of how other
internal organizations operate, allowing them to better understand each other's interests
and allow for better collaboration throughout the enterprise.
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Unless a project is cancelled, development of a manufacturing technology continues until
a viable, low-cost solution is found. In addition, teams must validate the new capability
and be able to reliably replicate the manufacturing process within the lab. Development
is extended to create appropriate work instructions and design an optimal factory layout
as needed. Once a manufacturing technology has been developed, the next step is to
implement the solution on the factory floor. "One of the chief challenges of innovation
lies not only in designing the process, but also implementing and replicating it within the
firm's operating environment."16 1
Ideally, the team responsible for developing a new technology would also be responsible
for its implementation in the factory. However, it may not be logistically viable for the
team to do so in terms of availability of time between development and implementation
as well as whether or not the development team possesses the implementation skills. To
ensure accountability between development and the end user, the development team
should be involved as much as possible during technology implementation and ramp-up
to its full capacity.
Finally, team members are ultimately responsible for transferring knowledge and
information from their efforts. Aside from aiding in the transfer of technology to the
factory floor, they are responsible for document their development efforts for subsequent
development teams to use. Documentation should include the lessons learned during
technology development that will improve the efficiency and productivity of future
projects. In addition, teams should disseminate the efforts of the AMDC to other internal
organizations to encourage other employees to participate in manufacturing innovation,
to bring credibility to the AMDC, to encourage other organizations to identify and
mitigate their manufacturing risks and to bring overall improvements to RMS.
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6.5. Create Rapid Manufacturing Development Capabilities
Finally, it is necessary to consider how the operation of the AMDC can fulfill its long-
term goal. The motivation for creating the AMDC was to create a competitive advantage
for Raytheon. Each manufacturing technology developed within the AMDC creates a
new capability for the company, providing numerous benefits such as built in
manufacturability, reduced production costs and facilitation of the transfer from design to
production.
However, the greater impact of the center is not in the specific capabilities developed but
rather the methodology used to identify and mitigate manufacturing risks. Strategic
operation of the center requires being able to view the impact of individual efforts across
the enterprise. It also incorporates academic theories and industry practices into the
operation. Considering the long-term benefits of current decisions facilitates initial buy-
in. For example, continuously analyzing the methods by which manufacturing technology
is developed can improve subsequent development projects by taking advantage of
learning curve benefits across teams. Ensuring teams learn from the previous efforts will
reduce the development cycle time, improve the efficiency of team performance and
require fewer investment resources for each project.
As previously mentioned, the AMDC manager's efforts to share successes are directly
related to the long-term performance and impact of the center. Establishing competence
within the center would allow RMS to extend their development capabilities to create
new manufacturing technologies for the supplier base; the benefits of which would
directly impact RMS products. Disseminating the AMDC efforts and successes
throughout RMS will improve internal visibility and support. Similarly, sharing RMS
efforts to other business units within Raytheon will encourage their recognition of the
need for manufacturing innovation and facilitate their support to begin similar centers
throughout the enterprise. Involving external customers in the development of new
manufacturing technologies will not only give customers an insider perspective on the
AMDC's capabilities but would also recognize RMS' competitive advantage in
development. Finally, publicizing AMDC efforts outside of Raytheon would generate
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additional recognition for all of the stakeholders for their efforts in manufacturing
innovation.
6.6. Chapter Summary
This chapter details an operational model for the AMDC that largely encompasses this
research. The model suggested sources to identify manufacturing technology needs. The
model includes alternatives to ensure a systematic, strategic outlook for development. In
addition, suggestions were made on the roles and responsibilities for the management of
technology as well as its development. The key factors in development involve
collaboration between engineering and development, accountability between the two
communities and incentives that encourage effective technology development.
For RMS, these benefits will translate directly to a more responsive company that is
equipped to develop and deliver better products within a faster development time and at
significantly cheaper costs. While the AMDC Operational Model developed for this
research is static to meet today's needs, it should be continually evaluated to ensure that
the AMDC is flexible and can respond to customer needs.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations
The purpose of this thesis project was to provide RMS with an academic perspective on
the implementation and development of a new organization. Research began by
identifying if there was a need for a company such as Raytheon to address manufacturing
technology innovation. The defense industry is changing where the main customer
demands that companies provide defense systems that are Better, Faster and Cheaper.
Therefore, it is only natural that Raytheon, or any other defense company that wishes to
remain competitive, change to meet the new customer needs.
Implementing a new organization faces a number of challenges. RMS is doing well
financially and it is more difficult for a company to change without a burning platform.
Also, manufacturing innovation requires collaboration and coordination with the
engineering organization. Many American manufacturing companies are struggling to
break down the barriers that prohibit the manufacturing and engineering communities
from working together. A number of different business tools were used to characterize
the cultures and identify options to encourage collaboration. Establishing accountability
and appropriate incentives would greatly facilitate changing the two cultures and their
current practices.
One of Raytheon's main motivations for including a research project within their
development efforts was to be able to study information from academia and other
companies. Through benchmarking, RMS has learned general principles that other
companies use to manage and develop new manufacturing technologies. Finally, an
operational model was developed that in essence summarizes the results of this research,
to focus on how to manage and develop new manufacturing technologies and capabilities.
7.1. Research Assessment
As a scientific study, a research project ideally poses a hypothesis and consequently
creates experiments to prove, or disprove, its accuracy. Since this thesis is focused on
practical applications within a company, there are logistical constraints in performing a
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complete scientific study. Given the slow clockspeed of the industry, change is
internalized at a slow rate. The acceptance of the AMDC within Raytheon as well as
changes to product development will likely take years. While the initial stages of
implementation coincided with the beginning of this research project, the on-site research
ended before any significant theories could be applied. Similar to what academics have
found, the effectiveness of this research cannot be proven. It is not feasible to track the
correlation between suggestions offered through this research, those implemented, and
the success of the center. There are a myriad of other factors that affect the success of the
center that cannot be separated from the suggestions offered in this research. The
following sections describe the progress of different activities.
7.1.1. AMDC Implementation
Implementation of the AMDC though slow has progressed significantly since its
inception in June of 2002. Thus far, the center has generated strong support by the
leadership team at RMS on an enterprise level. In addition, significant steps have been
taken to build relationships with other stakeholders. The overlap in some of the
stakeholders within Operations was addressed, where boundaries, roles, and
responsibilities of each were defined. Eventually, the expectation is that some of the
different groups will consolidate as each evolves to better match the company needs.
In early January 2003, the AMDC moved to its new location, sharing laboratory facilities
with the Knowledge Center and collocated with Advanced Programs. The AMDC
management has pitched the center's purpose and goals to leaders throughout Advanced
Programs to generate awareness and acceptance of the need for manufacturing
technology research.
The System Dynamics models developed were useful in relating the author's mental
models and impressions of the organization to the leader's perceptions. Feedback
received from these leaders clarified the model and simplified assumptions that the author
had made. In general, management accepted that the current driver of all efforts within
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RMS was product development and technology. It was agreed that the core competitive
advantage of Raytheon lies in their ability to continually innovate and develop new
defense systems. In addition, the Director of Operations and the Director of Engineering
are working to develop new metrics, incentives and accountability to encourage
collaboration between the two communities on an enterprise level. The causal loop
diagram has generated interest within RMS to use as a tool to help characterize mental
models and causal relationships.
During implementation, a number of key issues surfaced that were unexpected.
Primarily, within RMS it is important for a cost center to network in order to sell its
service. Networking, particularly within hierarchical organizations, builds on pre-
existing internal relationships that rely heavily on established trust and credibility. The
center manager for the AMDC and the author were brought in from organizations outside
of RMS. Outsiders enter an organization with no internal credibility and attempting to
build a network and address internal issues is more difficult. Aside from establishing the
AMDC, there are multiple efforts currently in place to improve the performance of RMS
on different levels. Raytheon Six Sigma projects are receiving constant attention to
encourage all employees to become involved. Also, the supply chain has undergone a
significant reorganization to establish better management and control and reduce costs
throughout the value stream. Finally, there are a number of 'Design for X' programs,
such as manufacturing, six sigma, assembly and so forth, in use to improve current
product development designs.
In the beginning of the research project, the author proposed an implementation roadmap
that outlined a timeline of different steps needed to implement the center. The roadmap
was based primarily on the three lenses analysis detailed in Section 4.3. The timeline
was created to meet the internship timeline rather than to reflect the slow clockspeed of
the defense industry. Networking, selling the idea and obtaining buy-in for the AMDC
took much longer than anticipated. Generating research funds and identifying projects
also took significantly longer than expected, preventing any theories from the operational
model from being implemented and examined for effectiveness. In addition, facilities
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were not ready until the end of the internship, and the AMDC operated as a virtual
organization mostly involved in planning during the course of the research.
7.1.2. Benchmarking Efforts
One of the main goals of this research was to benchmark companies in a number of
different industries to capture best practices for manufacturing technology development
and innovation. The benchmarking interviews were conducted to identify the major
factors that companies believe affect the need for manufacturing innovation. It allowed
the researcher the ability to understand the value that different companies placed on
manufacturing research and its place within product development. Through those
interviews, information was gathered to characterize the industries. The characterization
resulted in identifying two industries that could be considered best in class,
semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. The author submitted this information to RMS as
potential and rather promising sites to gather best practices.
As was briefly mentioned, the author's attempts to arrange site visits at companies within
these industries proved difficult. Unfortunately, no companies were visited during the
course of this research. However, it is still in the best interest of the AMDC to continue
to research other companies, form relationships, and arrange site visits at other
companies.
7.1.3. AMDC Operational Model
The Operational Model developed for the AMDC encompassed a significant portion of
this research. To a large degree, the model depends on the center's ability to reach a
steady state after the implementation and acceptance have occurred. At the end of the
research project, a number of distinct portions of the model were under development. A
Manufacturing Technology Committee was being established. Key individuals
throughout the enterprise were being identified that fit the description outlined in Section
6.2.1. In addition, the author was charged with creating a Manufacturing Technology
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Roadmap. General details of the roadmap are included in Section 6.2.2. RMS and
AMDC leaders accepted the need to think strategically about development projects and
investments and were focusing on long-term plans for the center.
7.2. Follow-up
The focus of this thesis was to address the management of technology as well as
implementing organizational change as they pertained to manufacturing innovation. The
research matched the specific needs of this particular project within RMS. Additional
research is recommended to prove the theories presented in this thesis and extend the
application of these theories outside of the defense industry. This section also presents
additional suggestions for RMS to follow
7.2.1. Research Follow-up
While the author's time at the company was limited, future efforts should be made, either
by subsequent LFM students interning at RMS or by existing RMS management, to
evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation efforts and the operational model. As
time progresses, additional academic research will be available that studies the
development of manufacturing technology, as it is a relatively young field. It is unlikely
that a magic methodology will be developed that solves the problems of manufacturing
innovation. Instead, research on manufacturing technology development work will likely
result in similar generalities for effective product development.
One of the major challenges on manufacturing innovation is the strategic implication that
must be considered. Research on strategy, such as how to evaluate potential projects for
development, how to evaluate projects in progress, how to set incentives and
accountability to ensure collaboration and effective development, is needed. However,
developing generic strategies for development will not lead to competitive advantages.
Strategy research should focus on developing and understanding the different tools
available as well as understanding the underlying implications of each. Within academia,
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strategy and organizational change are challenging fields to research, as it is difficult to
differentiate between the outcome of a strategic decision and good or bad luck.
7.2.2. Company Follow-up
In particular, RMS and the AMDC should continue the benchmarking efforts that began
with this research to create opportunities to find best practices for manufacturing
innovation. In building relationships with other companies, RMS should identify their
internal practices that could be shared as quid pro quo. Identifying best practices as well
as the organizational structure and policies that facilitate and encourage their use is
difficult to do without an established relationship at other companies. The most effective
way to absorb critical information, particularly as it pertains to organizations and culture,
is through first-hand experience; hence the need for benchmarking site visits.
Within RMS, subsequent efforts should focus on evaluating the success of the company.
Developing a model that describes the current operation of the center would allow
management to compare it to the operational model developed in this research. Any
discrepancies between the two should be evaluated to determine if the operational model
should be updated or if the center's policies should be modified to ensure the effective
development of new manufacturing technologies. Particular attention should be paid to
the current decisions that are made as temporary solutions to ensure that they do not
result in a status quo that prevents optimal manufacturing innovation. It is the inherent
beliefs that have led to the current gap between product and process development and
only with diligent management efforts to change those beliefs will the entire product
development process be improved.
In addition, the AMDC can be used as a training and experiment facility for ways to
improve the product development methodology throughout the enterprise. In particular,
the AMDC's emphasis on collaborative development can be used to test changes to the
organizational structure and culture to encourage and facilitate product development.
Lessons learned from technology development within in the center should be
- 132-
disseminated across the entire company. If the culture can be changed among a subset of
employees, they can encourage change within their respective organizations thereby
improving the entire product development process at RMS.
7.3. Chapter Summary
It is the author's belief that the theories and research presented in this thesis will facilitate
the implementation and development of the AMDC to allow Raytheon to meet the
changing customer needs. Along with the author, it is the belief of RMS leaders that
effective development of manufacturing innovation will improve the overall product
development methodology within the company resulting in the development of improved
systems within shorter time frames and at lower developments costs. These results are all
crucial for Raytheon to remain competitive in the new defense era of Better, Faster,
Cheaper.
As industry and customer needs are constantly changing, companies such as Raytheon
should be aware of changes in industry and the competitive environment to ensure that
they are prepared to evolve as is needed to remain competitive. In addition, the AMDC,
its operational model, as well as its strategies and policies should be continually
evaluated and improved upon so that a dynamic best practice of process development
exists and can be shared throughout Raytheon's business units.
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Appendices
A. System Dynamics
"System dynamics is a method to enhance learning in complex systems. Just as an airline
uses flight simulators to help pilots learn, system dynamics is, partly, a method for
developing flight simulators, often computer simulation models, to help us learn about
dynamic complexity, understand the sources of policy resistance, and design more
effective policies."162 People have a tendency to increase the complexity of systems to a
level that no one person can absorb, demystify, or manage let alone accelerate change.
"All around us are examples of 'systematic breakdowns'... organizations breakdown,
despite individual brilliance and innovative products, because they are unable to pull their
diverse functions and talents into a productive whole. "163 Complicating the matter
further, individuals often understand only a portion of the system and create mental
models of that world to simplify it into a manageable size.
Causal Loop diagrams are, in effect, the first phase of System Dynamics models. A
causal loop diagram is a way to visually document mental models of how a system
operates. For example, the diagram below is a causal loop diagram denoting a simplified
system of chicken population.
Road
Crossings B Chickens R) Eggs
Delay
Figure 16 Causal Loop Diagram - Chicken Population164
162 Sterman, pg 26.
163 Senge,pg.69
164 Sterman, the Chicken system example is taken from the book and lectures for its simple approach to
illustrating the basics of causal loop diagrams.
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The primary variable in the system is the number of Chickens. The two variables that
affect the number of Chickens in the system are the number of Eggs in the system as well
as the number of times chickens attempt Road Crossings. The arrows denote that a
variable influences a subsequent variable in either a positive or negative way. The left
loop can be verbalized in the following manner. The more Chickens there are in the
system, the higher the overall number of Road Crossings that will be attempted. Of those
Chickens that attempt to cross the road, a percentage of them will meet untimely deaths at
which point the overall population of Chickens will decrease. Conversely, if there are
fewer Chickens in the system, the number that will attempt to Road Crossings will
decrease and the Chicken population will not be affected by accidental deaths. In this
system, the left loop is a balancing loop, denoted in the center of the loop with a B. In
other words, there is a natural balance to the system, a steady state that prohibits the
radical growth or complete demise of the number of Chickens.
The right loop in this causal loop diagram shows that an increase in the number of
Chickens will result in an increase in the number of Eggs in the system; more chickens
lay more Eggs. As Eggs hatch, they will increase the size of the Chicken population.
Conversely, if there are fewer chickens in the system, due to an unforeseen event such as
an automobile plowing into the henhouse, there will be a reduction in the number of Eggs
laid and consequently, a further decrease in the number of Chickens. Another factor in
the system is Delay, a time lapse between a change in one variable and its influence on
the next variable. In this case, there is inherently a natural gestation period that limits the
rate at which Eggs are converted into Chickens. The right loop is a reinforcing loop,
denoted in the center of the loop with an R, since whatever condition exists will be
reinforced until either the Chicken population explodes or is eliminated.
Given that this is a relatively simple system, it is intuitive that the right loop dominates
the system behavior (assuming that there are significantly fewer Chicken deaths due to
Road Crossings than Eggs hatched). In this particular case, the steady state of the system
relates to the stable population growth rate. If the only reduction in the number of
Chickens occurs by their futile attempts to cross the road, then the population will
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increase as Eggs are continuously laid and grow up to be Chickens that lay more Eggs. In
order to grow the Chicken population more efficiently, attempts should be made to
increase the strength of the dominant loop; increase either the rate at which the Egg
population grows or increase the speed with which they hatch and become Chickens, all
within natural system limits.
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B. Manager Level Causal Loop Diagram Description
The causal loop diagram describing the response to the implementation of the new center
at the managerial level is shown in Figure 10. Section 4.4.2 described how the various
balancing and reinforcing loops interacted within the entire system. The primary focus of
the manager level causal loop diagram is the implementation of the new center. For this
research, the new center specifically denotes the AMDC and involves the pursuit of
manufacturing innovation early in development that requires additional resources and
attention by management. The term 'new goals' is used to generalize the model to
include other initiatives that a company may undertake. For the AMDC, the
identification and mitigation of manufacturing risks are the new goals. Similarly, new
tasks and risks are new projects that are started to pursue the new goals. It is important to
distinguish manufacturing innovation projects with product development programs for
this model. This appendix will expand upon each loop, highlighting the principal
behaviors of each parameter.
B1 Pursuit of New Goals Initially Decreases Program Performance
With the introduction of a new center, more resources must be allocated to pursue the
new goals and are therefore diverted from traditional development. As fewer resources
are allocated from traditional development, it becomes more difficult to meet program
requirements and program performance suffers, consequently there is less support of the
new center.
B2 Pursuing New Goals Decreases Perception of Manager's Capabilities
As the center is introduced and resources are allocated, it is more likely that tasks and
risks will be identified. As more risks are highlighted, the perception of program
performance and that of the manager's competence decreases leading to decreased
support for the new center.
B3 Redirecting Resources Minimizes Control
As resources are allocated to pursue new goals, there is decreased management control
over resources leading to decreased level of management's control. As control decreases,
there is more resistance to change that leads to decreased support of the center.
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B4 Greater Scope Reduces Control
Similar to loop B3, the implementation of a new center and pursuit of new goals
increases the scope of the program and decreases a manager's control over the direction
of development, leading to a further decrease in management's overall control.
B5 Resistance to More Work
As the program scope increases, the manager's level of responsibility and workload also
increases leading to added complexity. More work complexity reduces the manager's
available time to fulfill all of the new responsibilities leading to added frustration and
decreased support of the center.
B6 Manager's Personal Drive*
As work complexity increases, the type of work manager's face becomes increasingly
challenging. The additional degree of challenge triggers a manager's drive to meet the
challenge leading them to get exposed to the new work and gain experience. As
manager's gain experience over time, they develop a new skill set that decreases the
complexity and consequently the challenge of the work. This loop, although it
encourages the establishment of the new center and the pursuit of the new goals, is a
balancing loop because there is a steady state in the level of the work complexity a
manager is comfortable with. In effect, manager's will seek to balance work complexity
with challenge as there is only a certain amount of work complexity that will trigger the
drive to overcome the challenge before the managers become complacent and, in this
case, become opposed to the new workload and center.
RI Efficiencies Allow Managers to Redirect Funds as Necessary
Once tasks and risks are identified for the new center, they will eventually be resolved to
reach the program goals. Over time as more tasks are resolved, teams gain more
experience that, through learning, reduces the resources required and adds flexibility to
the allocation of the program budget. Flexibility leads to a reduction in the amount
resources are directed to pursue new goals and triggers the reversal of initial balancing
loops described earlier.
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R2 Learning that Improves Project Cycle Time
As more risks are resolved and teams gain experience, learning results in a reduction of
the time required to complete tasks and consequently more risks can be addressed.
R3 Learning that Improves Resource Efficiency
Similar to R2, experience and learning eventually leads to a reduction of resources
required for each task thereby allowing more tasks to be identified. Efficiency leads to
more risks being resolved within a shorter timeframe.
R4 After Time, Program Performance Improves
As risks are addressed, program performance improves leading to support of the new
center. This loop represents the validation and credibility that must be built to
demonstrate the benefits of manufacturing innovation and gain support for the AMDC.
R5 Support from Management Facilitates the Internalization of Goals
Support from management builds on their desire to contribute and adds to their level of
experience with the new type of work. Eventually, experience leads to an increased
ability of managers to facilitate and support the efforts of manufacturing innovation
teams. As teams receive more support, they gain more experience leading to increased
program performance.
R6 Positive Attitude Eases the Change Process
A manager's desire to contribute, leads to additional experience and an eventual
reduction in frustration resulting in support of the center. A positive attitude facilitates a
manager's response to the implementation of the new center.
R7 Sharing Information Reduces Resistance
Active participation during implementation leads to a freer flow of information and trust
between the AMDC and different stakeholders. As trust is increased, the level of chaos
and uncertainty caused by change is decreased resulting in an increase to the manager's
level of control over their environment.
R8 Stakeholder Involvement Increases Support
If the center's introduction involves generating active participation by the stakeholders it
leads to obtaining their support. Stakeholder support leads to collaboration on the center
implementation where the stakeholders lead change and thereby acquire control over the
direction of development.
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R9 Learning that Increases Competence
With the introduction of a new center, there is an inherent desire for managers to
contribute to the new initiative. This desire allows individuals to gain experience with
the new type of work. With experience and time, new skill sets can be developed that
reduce the work complexity, expand upon the available time, reducing the initial levels of
frustration and leading to support of the new center.
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C. Employee Level Causal Loop Diagram Description
As described in Section 4.4.3, a causal loop diagram was developed to understand the
response of change at the employee level. The diagram is shown in Figure 11. The
primary driver of the model is the introduction of a new initiative that attempts to
combine to some degree the engineering and operations communities. For this research,
the new initiatives are manufacturing innovation projects with the AMDC. Similar to
Appendix C, the behaviors of the balancing and reinforcing loops of the employee level
diagram will be expanded in this appendix.
B1 Belief that Pure Design Focus Will Satisfy Customer
The mental model of the engineering community is that meeting program requirements
leads to an increase in customer satisfaction and a reduction of external pressures to meet
the requirements. If engineers focus exclusively on designing the product without other
considerations such as manufacturing, the status quo belief is that program requirements
of technology and performance will be met. If there are no added external pressures from
the customer, management's desire to influence development to alter the status quo
decreases and there are consequently no internal pressures to meet additional
requirements. Without additional internal pressures on the engineers above their existing
commitments, frustration levels are relatively low. The balancing factor in this loop
occurs when a steady state is reached, i.e. engineers find a balance between the extent to
which they focus on the design aspects of the program and their level of frustration.
B2 Management's Indirect Bias Against New Initiative
A manager's bias to continue pursuing technological development leads to the
establishment of incentives that encourage a focus on design. With no external pressures
to alter product development, engineers are measured on their ability to complete the
design further encouraging the status quo.
B3/B5 Increase in Engineering/ Operations Workload Discourages Support
Similar to what managers experience with new work, a new initiative increases the
workload of all employees. A higher workload results in a reduction to the time and
resources available to address all tasks. Fewer time and resources leads to an increase in
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frustration that encourages employees to reduce their workload and return to address the
type of tasks in program development before the new initiative was introduced.
Consequently, there is a decreased support of the initiative by the employees.
B4 Bias Toward Design Results in Reduced Resources for Operations
Although loop B1 shows a balancing loop that encourages the status quo, eventually the
engineering schedule slips since other factors in program development are ignored. As
the schedule slips, additional resources are required by the engineering community that
are consequently increased to meet program requirements. Resources are diverted from
engineering to operations resulting in an increase to the level of frustration by employees
within operations. As mentioned earlier, as frustration increases, employees tend to focus
on their previous workload, resulting in decreased support of the new initiative.
R1/R6 Learning Curve Effects in Engineering/Operations
With time and experience, employees can garner the benefits of learning, thereby
reducing the time and resources required to complete tasks and decreasing the level of
frustration. As frustration is reduced, there is a shift in the steady state of balancing loops
B1 and B2 and the exclusive focus in design is reduced.
R2 Long-Term Customer Dissatisfaction from Pure Design Focus
As designs are thrown over the wall to production to meet program requirements, there is
the increased possibility of subsequent engineering changes flowing to operations to
further enhance program performance and technology. More engineering changes late in
the development stage eventually results in a decreased ability by operations to meet
other program requirements such as cost and delivery timeline. Not meeting
requirements results in decreased customer satisfaction leading to external pressure for
the company to meet those requirements. External pressure from the customer leads
managers to alter the course of development and generate internal pressure for employees
to meet the requirements. Increased pressure leads to an increase in frustration and alters
the steady state of the balancing loops B1 and B2, leading eventually to increased support
of collaborative initiatives.
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R3/R5 Collaborative Work Improves Engineering's/Operations' Contribution to
Product Performance
As employees support the new initiative, they are eventually able to build their skill set so
that other issues are addressed during development - leading to more collaborative work
and the elimination of designs being thrown over the wall. As collaboration increases,
fewer changes are needed in later stages of development and customer requirements are
consistently met, thereby improving the overall product performance.
R4 Accountability Leads to Initiative Support
As employees develop new skill sets, their ability to contribute to collaborative work also
increases. Introducing accountability into the current system is an external factor that
prevents designs from being thrown over the wall and generates incentives leading
employees to support the new initiative.
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D. Quantitative Benchmarking Questionnaire
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Title: Manufacturing Development
Benchmarking Study (Blinded)
To: Study Participants
Date: 01/06/03
Knowledge Transfer & Benchmarking
Office
Bill Baker
Raytheon KT&B Champion
Barbara Newell
Raytheon Benchmarking Coordinator
972-344-0400
When we benchmark, we search for best
methods, practices, and processes. Our goal
is to adopt or adapt the best features of a
process or practice and to implement those
best features in our own process to produce
the "best of the best."
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Manufacturing Development
Benchmarking Study
Scope:
To understand how leading companies approach advanced manufacturing
technology and development.
Contact/sponsor of the study: Raytheon Operations
Study Schedule:
The schedule was established and required an approximate three-week
turnaround. The schedule is shown below.
Manufacturing Development Benchmarking Study Schedule - 2002
Week Week
1 2
Nov
Week
3
Dec
Wek We Wee Wek We
Kickoff
Submitted survey
tool
Obtained survey
tool approval
Collect data
Analyze data
Project
completion
Raytheon Company
Manufacturing Development Benchmarking Survey
- 152 -
. .................... . . . .....
Week
4
Week
1
Week
2
Week
3
Week
4
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Responses:
We received responses from the following companies:
Raytheon, plus five high technology companies.
Raytheon Company - 153 -
Manufacturing Development Benchmarking Survey
Findings:
Question 1: All five respondents did not rate themselves highly (all rated 5 of 10
points) on integration of manufacturing with product development cycle -
including Raytheon.
Question 2: Manufacturing capabilities were rated high by:
Company Rating
Company B 9
Company A 9
Company D 8
Company F 8
Question 3: Four of five respondents have active, cutting edge manufacturing
technology approaches:
Company B Company D
Company C Com an F
Question 4: Company B is the only "new comer" to advanced manufacturing
technologies - 3 years.
Question 5: All respondents rated themselves above average on their
company's ability to develop and implement new processes (ratings of 6 to 8 on
the 10 point scale).
Question 6: Some companies require "manufacturing capability verification" on
all new products:
- Company B
" Company E
Question 7: All companies but Company E utilize a Technology Roadmap:
- Company B
- Company C
- Company D
- Company F
" Company A
Question 8: Raytheon
Roadmaps!
is the lowest ranked on the actual use of Technology
Company Rating
Company B 8
Company F 6
Company C 5
Raytheon Company
Manufacturing Development Benchmarking Survey
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Company A 2
Question 9: Most companies have standard processes to develop and fund
"manufacturing technology and transition products to production."
Question 10: Organizationally, manufacturing development is:
Centralized in
Operations Decentralized
Company B Company E
Company C Company F
Company D
Company A
Question 11: Companies use design engineers and scientists in addition to
manufacturing/industrial engineers.
Question 12: Depending on the organization - companies indicate hundreds of
people involved in manufacturing technology development.
Question 13: Most companies "permanently assign" employees to
manufacturing development. Only Company E and Raytheon "loan" employees.
Question 14: "Allure of challenging new technology" is the incentive for all
respondents including Raytheon.
Question 15: All respondents funding comes from overhead pools except
Raytheon (program funding).
Question 16: Funding from programs, product lines or platforms have options to
support or provide funding requests.
Question 17: Funding profiles vary widely, but more commercial businesses
(Company F, Company D, Company B) tend to provide more funding to products
in development.
Question 18: Suggested Benchmarks:
Aerojet By Company D
DuPont By Company F
3M By Company F
Kodak By Company F
Question 19: All respondents except Company B are open to a more detailed
discussion (teleconference or site visit).
Raytheon Company
Manufacturing Development Benchmarking Survey
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Benchmarking Study Matrix:
Companies
0 0 0 W U.
Questions c 10 cc
Are you answering for your:
Company X X X
Division I
Department X X
Other X
Indiv
1. On a scale of 1 to 10, how do you rate your company
on integrating manufacturing within the product 5 5 5 5 5 5
development cycle? (10=integral in all aspects,
1 =completely separate)
2. How would you rate your company's ability to provide
the manufacturing capabilities needed? (10=excellent, 9 9 7 8 5 8
1=poor)
3. Do ou actively develop new, advanced, or cutting Y Y Y Y N Y
edge manufacturing processes and technologies? Y/N
4. How long has your company been
actively/aggressively involved in developing advanced 20+ 3 30+ 50+ 100
manufacturing technology capabilities? (in years)
5. How do you rate your company's ability to develop
new manufacturing processes and turn those into 8 8 8 7 6 8
capabilities? (1 0=world class, 1 =lagging industry)
6. To what degree are new products evaluated to
identify critical manufacturing capabilities before they
are transitioned into production?
Evaluation required of all products X X X
Evaluation of products recommended X X X
Evaluation would be useful but not currently
done
Evaluation isn't necessary
7. Do you use a form of manufacturing technology Y Y Y Y N Y
roadmaps? Y/N
8. If so, please rate to what extent you use the
roadmaps to guide manufacturing development or
investment. (10=used as an explicit plan, 1=used as a 2 8 5 5 6
thinking exercise)
9. Does your company have a standard process for the
following activities? (Please check all that apply)
To transition products or components from X X X X X X
design into production?
To develop new, advanced or cutting edge X X X
manufacturing technologies?
Raytheon Company
Manufacturing Development Benchmarking Survey
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Questions
C
C
cc
CL
E00
0
CL
0.
0
Companies
Cto
C
C
0v
0.
L
E0C)
U.
a
E
0
U)
9. (cont.) Does your company have a standard process
for the following activities? (Please check all that apply)
To choose which technologies to invest in and X X X
develop?
To evaluate the progress of development X X X X Xprojects?
10. What is the organizational structure surrounding
manufacturing development and innovation?
Group within the design community
Group within operations or manufacturing X X X X
Separate entity
Decentralized, spread throughout the enterprise X X
11. What is the mix of skills of employees involved in
advanced manufacturing technology development?
Mostly design engineers X X
Mostly manufacturing or industrial engineers X
Mostly scientists X
Even balance X X X
12. How many employees are involved in advanced 12 200 600 100 1 -500
manufacturing technology development?
13. When staffing advanced manufacturing technology
development needs, which of the following best
describes the process?
Employees are loaned to a manufacturing X Xdevelopment project as needed
Employees are periodically rotated throughout
different areas, including manufacturing
development
Employees are permanently assigned to X X X X
manufacturing development efforts
Other, explain
14. Which of the following best describes the most
common form of incentives for employees to work on
developing advanced manufacturing technology
capabilities?
Additional bonus/salary upgrade
Allure of challenging new technology X X X X X X
Critical part of career path X
Other, explain
15. Where does the majority of funding for advanced
manufacturing technology development come from?
Internal, overhead investment X X X X X
Programs, product lines or platforms X
External, customer investment X
Raytheon Company
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Questions
C*E
02
M.
E
C
'U
a.E0
C
E
U
Companies
LU
21%
C
a
E00
E
16. To what extent do programs, product lines or
platforms invest in manufacturing development?
All are required to invest a fixed amount X
As managers within those areas deem X X X X
necessary
As suggested by other managers, leaders
Not at all X
17. What percentage of manufacturing development
funds are dedicated to each of the following:
To support existing product lines? 80% 30% 70% 20% 60%
To support products in development? 10% 40% 20% 60% 30%
To develop new, advanced or cutting edge 10% 30% 10% 20% 10%
manufacturing technologies?
18. Is there any one company that you consider as
being a recognized leader in manufacturing technology N N N Y N Y
development? Y/N
If so, which one? 
-
'I))
0
19. Would you be willing to discuss your response in Y N Y Y Y Y
more detail in a teleconference or site visit? Y/N I I
Raytheon Company
Manufacturing Development Benchmarking Survey
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Survey Details:
Manufacturing Development
Benchmarking Study
Purpose/Scope of this Raytheon Benchmarking Study: To understand how leading
companies approach advanced manufacturing technology & development.
Company/Organization Name:
Street Address:
City:
State: Zip:
Phone: Fax:
Contact Name:
Contact Email Address:
Industry:
Major Product or Service:
Are you reporting for your: F1 Company? L Division? L Department? L
Other?
1. On a scale of 1 to 10, how do you rate your company on integrating manufacturing
within the product development cycle? (10 = integral in all aspects, 1 = completely
separate efforts) _ .
2. How would you rate your company's ability to provide the manufacturing capabilities
needed? (10 = excellent, 1 = poor)_.
3. Do you actively develop new, advanced, or cutting edge manufacturing processes
and technologies? LI Y L N
4. How long has your company been actively/aggressively involved in developing
advanced manufacturing technology capabilities?
5. How do you rate your company's ability to develop new manufacturing processes
and turn those into capabilities? (10 = world class, 1 = lagging industry) .
6. To what degree are new products evaluated to identify critical manufacturing
capabilities before they are transitioned into production?
L Evaluation is required of all products
L Evaluation of products is recommended
LI Evaluation would be useful but currently isn't done
[I Evaluation isn't necessary
7. Do you use a form of manufacturing technology roadmaps? LI Y L N
Raytheon Company
Manufacturing Development Benchmarking Survey
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8. If so, please rate to what extent you use the roadmap to guide manufacturing
development or investment. (10 = used as an explicit plan, 1 = used as a thinking
exercise) .
9. Does your company have a standard process for the following activities? (Please
check all that apply)
E] To transition products or components from design to production?
L To develop new, advanced or cutting edge manufacturing technologies?
[]To choose which technologies to invest in and develop?
L To evaluate the progress of development projects?
10. What is the organizational structure surrounding manufacturing development and
innovation?
L Group within the design community
L Group within operations or manufacturing
E: Separate entity
LI Decentralized, spread throughout the enterprise
11. What is the mix of skills of employees involved in advanced manufacturing
technology development?
L Mostly design engineers
L Mostly manufacturing or industrial engineers
LI Mostly scientists
F] Even balance
12. How many employees are involved in advanced manufacturing technology
development?
13. When staffing advanced manufacturing technology development needs, which of the
following best describes the process?
i Employees are loaned to a manufacturing development project as needed
L Employees are periodically rotated throughout different areas, including
manufacturing development
L Employees are permanently assigned to manufacturing development efforts
L Other, please explain
14. Which of the following best describes the most common form of incentives for
employees to work on developing advanced manufacturing technology capabilities?
L Additional bonus/salary upgrade
L Allure of challenging new technology
L Critical part of career path
L Other, please explain .
15. Where does the majority of funding for advanced manufacturing technology
development come from?
l Internal, overhead investment
L Programs, product lines or platforms
L External, customer investment
L Other, please explain
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16. To what extent do programs, product lines or platforms invest in manufacturing
development?
r_ All are required to invest a fixed amount
F] As managers within those areas deem necessary
As suggested by other managers, leaders
Not at all
17. What percentage of manufacturing development funds are dedicated to each of the
following:
% To support existing product lines?
% To support products in development?
% To develop new, advanced or cutting edge manufacturing technologies,
tools & processes?
18. Is there any one company that you consider as being a recognized leader in
manufacturing development technology? L Y E]N If so, which one? .
19. Would you be willing to discuss your response in more detail in a teleconference or
site visit? R Y R N
We adhere to the IBC Benchmarking Code of Conduct and will share our
information with you and include you in our blinded Final Report.
Raytheon Manufacturing Development Benchmarking - Bill Baker, Coach
Please return completed surveys by 13 December 2002, to:
Benchmarking Coordinator
Barbara Newell
e-mail: b-newell1(Draytheon.com
Fax: 972-344-0405
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